Collaboration of Mobile and Pervasive Devices for Embedded Networked Systems by Kim, Su Jin (Author) et al.
Collaboration of Mobile and Pervasive Devices for Embedded Networked Systems
by
Su Jin Kim
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved November 2010 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Sandeep K. S. Gupta, Chair
Partha Dasgupta
Hasan Davulcu
Yann-Hang Lee
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
December 2010
ABSTRACT
Embedded Networked Systems (ENS) consist of various devices, which are embed-
ded into physical objects (e.g., home appliances, vehicles, buidlings, people). With rapid
advances in processing and networking technologies, these devices can be fully connected
and pervasive in the environment. The devices can interact with the physical world, col-
laborate to share resources, and provide context-aware services. This dissertation focuses
on collaboration in ENS to provide smart services. However, there are several challenges
because the system must be - scalable to a huge number of devices; robust against noise,
loss and failure; and secure despite communicating with strangers.
To address these challenges, first, the dissertation focuses on designing a mobile
gateway called Mobile Edge Computing Device (MECD) for Ubiquitous Sensor Net-
works (USN), a type of ENS. In order to reduce communication overhead with the
server, an MECD is designed to provide local and distributed management of a network
and data associated with a moving object (e.g., a person, car, pet). Furthermore, it
supports collaboration with neighboring MECDs. The MECD is developed and tested
for monitoring containers during shipment from Singapore to Taiwan and reachability
to the remote server was a problem because of variance in connectivity (caused by high
temperature variance) and high interference. The unreachability problem is addressed
by using a mesh networking approach for collaboration of MECDs in sending data to
a server. A hierarchical architecture is proposed in this regard to provide multi-level
collaboration using dynamic mesh networks of MECDs at one layer. The mesh network
is evaluated for an intelligent container scenario and results show complete connectivity
with the server for temperature range from 25◦C to 65◦C.
Finally, the authentication of mobile and pervasive devices in ENS for secure col-
laboration is investigated. This is a challenging problem because mutually unknown
i
devices must be verified without knowledge of each other’s identity. A self-organizing
region-based authentication technique is proposed that uses environmental sound to au-
tonomously verify if two devices are within the same region. The experimental results
show sound could accurately authenticate devices within a small region.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, advance in computing technology has made computing devices em-
bedded in the environments or objects. At the same time, the rapid deployment of wire-
less networks has enabled connecting these embedded systems for better services. For
example, in a health monitoring application, several medical devices (e.g., thermometers,
heart monitors and blood oxygen meters) can be embedded in a human’s body. These
devices themselves are embedded systems, but adding wireless communication capability
to such medical devices can help in accessing patient’s health information remotely.
Over the next years, embedded systems, wireless network technology and pervasive
computing will combine to provide smart services in people’s everyday life.
Pervasive computing (also called ubiquitous computing) is a new computing
paradigm that seamlessly integrates with the environment and enables a service to be
available anytime anywhere [1]. In pervasive computing, a system senses the physical
environment, process information, and adapts its behavior according to this information
called context. Context can be computing context (e.g., network connectivity and lo-
cal available resources), user context (e.g., user profiles and location), physical context
(e.g., noise level and temperature), or temporal context (e.g., day, month and season of
year). Context awareness of pervasive computing makes the system more intelligent and
invisible to users [1].
We refer to this system as an Embedded Networked System (ENS) [2]. ENS can
be widely used in many areas such as military, industrial and civilian application areas
including geophysical monitoring (seismic activity), precision agriculture (soil manage-
ment), habitat monitoring (tracking of animal herds), transportation (traffic monitoring),
business processes (supply chain management), and in the future, possibly cooperating
smart everyday things.
1
Embedded System
Wireless Network
Pervasive Computing
Embedded
Networked
System (ENS)
Context awareness
Collaboration
FeatureTechnology
Smart Service in everyday life
Fig. 1. Embedded Networked Systems (ESN).
1.1. Example Architecture of ENS
To understand the overall system architecture of ENS, this section discusses a type
of ENS called a Ubiquitous Sensor Network (USN).
A USN is a type of ENS that couples a wireless sensor network with the concept of
pervasive computing [3] [4]. The purpose of a USN is to provide information of objects
such as location and condition to anyone irrespective of the time or place. Fig. 2 shows
the architecture of USN [3] [4] [5].
A wireless sensor network is a wireless network consisting of large number of sen-
sor nodes equipped with embedded processors, sensors and radios [6]. These sensor
nodes collaborate to monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature,
humidity, light, vibration, or pressure.
In the USN, Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) is considered to be a special
type of sensors used for finding the location of moving objects [7]. RFID is a term to
describe a system to transmit the identity of an object using radio waves. RFID is similar
to bar code identification, but it does not require direct contact and line-of-sight scanning.
An RFID system consists of two components: a tag and a reader. The tag (also called
a transponder) is the identification device attached to the item to track. The reader
2
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Fig. 2. Architecture of USN.
(also called a transceiver) is the device which reads the signal from tags and transfers
the information to a processing device [8]. RFID systems can be used anywhere which
needs unique identification, generally for access control and tracking. Because RFID can
be used to detect the presence of a moving object, RFID can supplement wireless sensor
networks [7].
In the USN, end nodes (sensors and RFID devices) can be attached to any objects.
The data sensed by end nodes are sent to the remote server through a gateway. The
gateway is the interface between sensor nodes and the server. It collects data from sensor
nodes, reformats it, and delivers it to the server.
1.2. Collaboration in Embedded Networked Systems (ENS)
Compared to a general purpose computer (e.g., a desktop or laptop computer) that
is designed for a variety of functions, the embedded system has a set of specific tasks for
which the system is made [9].
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Fig. 3. Example Scenario: Smart Space.
By networking capability, ENS supports the collaboration of these embedded sys-
tems that perform their given tasks individually. Such collaboration essentially aims
to enhance the system performance as well as context awareness by sharing resources
or contextual information among embedded systems, generally systems that are located
nearby.
1.2.1. Example Scenarios
To explain benefits by such collaboration in ENS, this section will give example
scenarios in two popular applications: a smart space and an intelligent container.
The smart space is one of the most popular applications in ENS [2]. It includes a
wide range of applications from home automation, health care, and education applica-
tions to game/entertainment applications. Fig. 3 shows one example scenario of collab-
orative works in the smart space. Suppose Alice has a meeting with her co-workers in
a conference room. The mobile devices of people in the conference room (e.g., laptops,
smart phones or cell phones) can automatically form a group and exchange their contact
information. The presentation files in her laptop can be transfered to a projector in the
conference room. This group membership must be dynamically changed based on the
user’s location. That means those devices are no longer within a group when they leave
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Fig. 4. Example Scenario: Intelligent Container.
that conference room. After work, her mobile devices should join a home network to
communicate with other home appliances and devices.
Another example application is the intelligent container system [10] [11] that pro-
vides a real-time monitoring system for cargo containers for homeland security and global
supply chain management. In the global supply chain, cargo containers move together
in a ship, truck, or train and the network can be dynamically realigned with new neigh-
boring containers throughout the whole process of the supply chain shown in Fig. 4. The
collaboration between neighboring containers via this network can support monitoring of
containers and also enhance the security of containers. We will give more details below.
• Incompatible Goods Segregation: As per the UN (United Nations) Recommenda-
tions on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, incompatible goods shall be segregated
from one another during transport [12]. For example, two substances are considered
mutually incompatible when their stowing together may result in undue hazards
5
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Fig. 5. Sharing Information via Container Networks.
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in the case of leakage, spillage, or any other accident. This container network
can routinely ensure the segregation of incompatible materials through automatic
sensing and interchange of information via the mesh shown as Fig. 5(a).
• Hazardous Materials Monitoring : Containers which transport hazardous materials
are rigorously tracked throughout the supply chain. Hazardous materials may be
radioactive, flammable, explosive, toxic, corrosive, biohazardous, an oxidizer, an
asphyxiant, a pathogen, an allergen, or may be anything that can harm people,
other living organisms, or the environment [13]. Expensive chemical or biological
sensors may not be installed in every container. In this case, sensed data is com-
municated to not only a container on which the sensors are mounted, but by taking
advantage of the mesh network characteristics, also to containers in the vicinity.
Therefore, exchanging information about hazardous materials with neighboring
containers can extend the safety of the entire network shown as Fig. 5(b).
1.3. Design Principles and Challenges
This section discusses the basic design principles and challenges for ENS.
• Scalability : ENS consists of a large number of devices that continue to grow. Data
generated by these devices can be enormous. Additionally, these devices may need
to communicate this data to the base station. Due to this characteristic, ENS
should be able to handle an ever-increasing number of devices as well as data and
thus scalability is critical in designing ENS.
• Minimal user distraction: As the number of personal devices per person grows, it is
not reasonable to expect a user to pay attention and efforts to manage these many
devices (e.g., configuration, recharging, and updating new softwares). Ideally, a
7
pervasive computing solution is completely invisible to users so that the technology
disappears from a user’s conciousness. Because it is very hard to achieve perfect
invisibility, in practice, user distraction needs to be minimized.
• Robustness: Robustness is one of the challenging problems in ENS development.
ENS can be deployed in harsh environments such as the sea and forest, or place
with a lot of blockages. Therefore, it may be subject to increased node and link
failure rates. It is essential that the system can meet the mission requirements
despite the increased failure rates.
• Resource Constraint : One of important characteristics of ENS is resource con-
straints. Most of devices in ENS are battery powered and small-scale mobile de-
vices. Typically, size and energy constraints mean limited resources such as the
CPU performance, memory, and wireless communication bandwidth. While the
system is capable to support required functionality, it should be efficient in terms
of computation, communication and energy.
• Heterogeniety : Another issue is heterogeneity. ENS consists of various types of
devices from a laptop to a sensor which is designed for a specific set of tasks.
Therefore, they are diverse with respect to computation, communication, and en-
ergy capabilities. To deal with such heterogeneous devices, the system should be
flexible.
1.4. Outline and Contributions
In this section, we discuss the principal contributions of the dissertation. This
dissertation focuses on collaboration of neighboring gateways because of the following
reasons: 1) In ENS, interaction between embedded systems is mostly local and 2) neigh-
boring systems could detect same events. For example, when there is an earthquake or
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fire, several local systems will detect it and send an alert to the remote server. Instead
of passing all messages to the remote server, a gateway can remove redundant informa-
tion sent to the remote server. Further, the gateway also can share this information to
other local gateways directly. By supporting collaboration among local gateways, we can
reduce the amount of remote communication as well as the response time.
The goals of the dissertation are:
• to support collaboration among neighboring gateways that consist of a large num-
ber of end devices with high and unpredictable mobility patterns.
• to ensure reliable end-to-end communication between end nodes and remote users
even though there are node or link failures.
• to support authentication for a dynamic network of neighboring gateways that have
no knowledge about each other.
1.4.1. Scalability Problem in ENS
The first reseach question is how to support collaboration of neighboring gateways
for a large ESN. It is important because of the following reasons. First, the ESN consists
of a larger number of end nodes and the network size may further keep increasing to
millions or billions of nodes in the near future. Moreover, several end nodes installed
on a moving object (e.g., a person or vehicle) are moving around the world and the
mobility pattern of each object may be unknown. It is difficult to dynamically handle
these network changes for a large network. Second, gateway level collaboration requires
additional local data processing on a gateway as well as additional local communication
with neighboring gateways. Therefore, scalability problem becomes more critical.
To address this problem, this dissertation uses a mobile gateway that can move with
objects. The mobile gateway is installed on a moving object such as a person or vehicle
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and manages a local network of these end nodes in a distributed manner. Even though
an object moves to the other place, any changes of the other networks do not affect the
internal network of the object. The distributed system with such mobile gateways is
shown to scale well with the increasing network size (see Section 3.1).
This work focuses on USN to design such a mobile gateway called a Mobile Edge
Computing Device (MECD). An MECD manages the local network of sensor nodes that
are associated with an object. In order to supports local processing required by USN
applications, we investigate the general functional requirements of USN applications.
Based on these requirements, we design a component-based functional architecture of
the MECD in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 provides an MECD prototype implementation using the off-the-shelf
devices. To show the feasibility of our MECD, we apply this design to an intelligent
container system discussed in Section 1.2.1 which is one of the popular applications of
USN. Section 3.4 presents the details of an intelligent container case study including the
test-bed implementation and tests in an actual shipment scenario.
The primary contributions of this work are:
• MECD : The concept of MECD is introduced. The feasibility of the proposed
component-based architecture is shown by implementing the prototype.
• Case Study : An intelligent container system is developed and tested in an actual
shipment scenario. During this test, we learn important lessons for the future
research directions.
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1.4.2. Unreachability Problem in ENS
In our ENS, the mobile gateway plays an important role as an interface between
the end nodes and the server. Although it is responsible for connecting the end nodes
to the external network, it might not have a direct connection to the server because of
the physical environmental constraints. From the experimental studies in Section 3.4, we
learned that containers can be in a harsh environment such as sea that affects connectivity
between the mobile gateway and the server. Further, because of the high interference
from metal and dense materials in and around the containers, the container stacked at
the bottom might not be able to communicate with the server.
In order to solve this problem of unreachability, this work uses a dynamic mesh
network among neighboring gateways so that they can collaborate in sending sensed
data to the server. This mesh-networking approach can support reliable connectivity to
the server by redundant paths through the gateways.
In Section 4.1, we provide a hierarchical system architecture that support dynamic
mesh networks among MECDs at one level separately.
Section 4.2 provides evaluation of the MECD-level network in terms of reachability
to the server, network latency, and energy efficiency. Considering the intelligent container
scenario, we perform simulations with different temperatures, network densities, and
network sizes. The simulation results show that the MECD-level network can support
complete server reachability for ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
standard containers (6.1 m ≤ the container length ≤ 16.2 m) within the temperature
range of 25◦C to 65◦C. We also measure the average path length and the total energy
consumption of the MECD-level network to analyze the network latency and energy
efficiency. The simulation results reveal that the additional network delay and energy
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consumption generated by the MECD-level network is small. Finally, the simulation is
conducted to see the effects of the transmission power on the server reachability, network
latency, and energy efficiency.
The contributions of this work are:
• Dynamic Mesh Networking Approach: The dynamic mesh network of local MECDs
is used in order to ensure the reliable communication between the mobile gateway
and the server.
• Performance Analysis: The MECD-level network is analyzed in terms of the server
reachability, network latency, and energy efficiency. Further, an experimental study
shows the need for a dynamic scheduling of transmission power on the basis of the
temperature and container size to minimize the total energy consumption.
1.4.3. Authentication for ENS
The last part of this dissertation is to provide a new authentication mechanism
for ENS. An ENS is connected over a mix of wireless and wired networks. Due to the
inherent characteristic of wireless networks, they are more vulnerable to various attacks.
Therefore, authentication is necessary before access to resources and services via networks
is granted. The existing authentication mechanisms use a combination of the user input
such as a password, a trusted-third party, a pre-shared key or some biometrics. However,
such mechanisms for traditional computing environments are not appropriate for ENS
because of the following reasons.
• Mobile devices in ENS can move anywhere and communicate with strangers.
Therefore, mutually unknown devices need to verify each other’s identity.
• Another challenging problem is that this authentication process should be invisible
to users because of the design requirement of ENS as discussed in Section 1.3.
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• In ENSs, there is no fixed infrastructure. Thus, the authentication process must
be autonomous.
Therefore, the goal of this work is to develop a self-organizing authentication scheme
for mobile and pervasive devices that have never met before and have no pre-shared trust.
In this dissertation, we define the region-based authentication problem as the process
to prove one’s identity and authenticity by detecting its current region. In a traditional
authentication mechanism, a user claims who he is, however, in this work, a user claims
where he is. This work focuses on the region-based authentication problem because in
many ESN applications (e.g., smart home, supply chain management, and location-based
billing applications), devices in a particular region (e.g., a room, warehouse or building)
form a local network to collaborate.
To address the region-based authentication problem, we propose to take a cyber-
physical approach [14] which uses physical environments to generate a secret in Sec-
tion 5.3. Especially, this work uses the environmental sounds to generate a feature. The
primary reason is that only devices within the same region (e.g., a room) can hear the
similar sound. Therefore, the similarity of acoustic features is then used to verify the
device’s current region.
For the self-organizing region-based authentication using environmental sounds, the
main research question is which acoustic feature extraction technique is appropriate. This
question is addressed because of the resource limitation of ENS. There have been many
studies on acoustic feature extraction in speech recognition and audio classification.
However, they are too expensive to perform on the resource limited devices in ENS.
Section 5.3.2 presents an experimental study on acoustic feature extraction techniques
to meet requirements for the region-based authentication problem. In addition, trade-off
13
between accuracy and overhead is discussed in Section 5.3.2. Section 5.3.4 explains the
proposed authentication protocol and Section 5.3.5 provides the experimental results in a
smart home scenario. The results show that with the threshold for the feature similarity,
t ≥ 40%, complete dinstincitiveness can be achieved. The proposed scheme with sound
could work within a small region, but it may not work for a large region.
The contributions of this work are:
• Acoustic-based Solution: To address the self-organizing region-based authentication
problem, a simple acoustic-based solution is proposed.
• Experimental Study : Different acoustic feature extraction techniques are performed
with different environmental sounds. Our expermental results show that the fre-
quency domain technique provides more accurate distinctiveness than the time
domain techniques. In addition, the trade-off between accuracy and overhead is
studied experimentally.
• Performance Evaluation: The proposed acoustic-based solution is implemented on
a Google Android Dev 1 phone and evaluated in terms of the false positive rate
and false negative rate.
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2. BACKGROUND
This chapter describes the system model, assumptions, and technical/theoritical
background to understand the problems in designing ENS.
2.1. System Model and Assumptions
This dissertation assumes that the network consists of end nodes, gateways, and re-
mote servers. An end node itself is an embedded system that has an embedded processor
and wireless communication capability. However, the end node may not be able to sup-
port long-distance communication. End nodes are usually small, resource-limited and
inexpensive. They can be static, but mostly mobile. Further, it is assumed that mobile
end nodes can move freely around the world. When a node moves, it must participate
in a local network to collaboration with neighboring nodes. Therefore, the network is
assumed to be dynamic.
The remote server is assumed to have a considerably higher performance than the
end nodes. While an end node is performing given tasks, data can be collected and
processed at a remote server. Therefore, it is necessary to connect end nodes to the
external network.
The gateway is assumed to be capable of local and remote communication so that it
acts as an interface between end nodes and servers. It is also assumed that gateways have
more computational resources than end nodes to perform some local data processing.
The gateways also can be static or mobile. In this dissertation, they are assumed to
collaborate with other neighboring gateways.
2.2. Preliminaries
2.2.1. Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless mesh networking is an active research field. A mesh network is a type of
network that establishes an ad hoc network and maintains mesh connectivity [16]. In a
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Fig. 6. Mesh Networks.
fully connected mesh topology, all nodes are connected directly as shown in Fig. 6. It is
the ideal case with respect to the network delay because every node is within one hop.
Typically, a node has direct connection to some of the other nodes because of the cost.
In mesh networking, each node only needs to transmit a packet to the next node that
is connected directly. Nodes also act as repeaters to deliver a packet to the destinations
that is several hops away from the source node. In other words, the mesh network
supports multi-hop communications. The data is passed from a source to a destination
through a path that can be the shortest (in terms of hops), most reliable, or most energy-
efficient. Through multi-hop communications, the same coverage with classic wireless
networks can be achieved at a much lower cost and transmission power [17].
Wireless mesh networking is appropriate for wireless sensor networks because of the
following benefits.
• A wireless mesh network is reliable because the redundant paths of mesh networks
ensure alternative data paths and no single point of failure. If one node drops out
of the network, due to hardware failure or any other reason, its neighbors simply
find another route by the self-healing capability.
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• A wireless mesh network has self-configuring capability. When a node is added to
a network, the network automatically incorporates a new node into the existing
structure without needing any adjustments by a network administrator. Once the
node is initially configured, it continuously discovers its neighbors and recomputes
the path in a process known as dynamic routing.
• If it is needed to extend coverage, improve redundancy and link quality, it can
be simply achieved by adding additional nodes. Furthermore, the nodes in mesh
networks are easy to install and maintain (as simple as plug-and-play). Due to self-
configuring and redundancy characteristics of wireless mesh networks, they support
flexibility that allows route formation from any source node to any destination node
within the network and scalability that enables supporting thousands of individual
nodes.
2.2.2. Basic Security Requirements and Algorithms
Security in ENS is an important problem, but the security for this new computing
environment has not been explored in depth. One research direction of the dissertation
is to secure collaborative work in ENS. This section discusses the basic security concepts.
Most security services involve encryption and decryption. Encryption is the trans-
lation of original data called plaintext into an unintelligible form called ciphertext. De-
cryption is the reverse process which converts encrypted data back into its original form.
These operations are controlled both by cryptographic algorithms and keys. Broadly,
cryptographic algorithms can be classified into three classes as follows [18]:
• Symmetric ciphers (also called secret-key or shared-key algorithms) use a single key
for both decryption and encryption. A sender uses the key to encrypt plaintext
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and sends ciphertext to a receiver. The receiver applies the same key to decrypt
ciphertext and recover plaintext. They are typically used for ensuring confidential-
ity of data. Twofish, Serpent, AES, Blowfish, CAST5, RC4, TDES, DES, 3DES
and IDEA are examples of symmetric ciphers. Symmetric ciphers are significantly
faster than asymmetric ciphers, but the key must be exchanged securely before-
hand.
• Asymmetric ciphers (also called public-key algorithms), on the other hand, use
two different keys: a private key that is kept secret and known to only one person
and a public key that is public and available to everyone. The two keys are math-
ematically interrelated, but it is computationally infeasible to derive one key from
the other. A sender encrypts plaintext using a receiver’s public key and sends ci-
phertext to the receiver. The receiver then decrypts it using his private key. They
are typically used for verifying certificates that identify communicating peers and
for exchanging symmetric cipher keys. RSA and Diffie-Hellman are examples of
asymmetric ciphers. These algorithms rely on the use of computationally inten-
sive mathematical functions, such as modular exponentiation, for encryption and
decryption.
• Hashing functions (also called message digests and one-way encryption) such as
MD5 and SHA provide ways of mapping an arbitrary block of data (with or without
a key) into a fixed-length string, thereby providing message integrity checks and
digital signatures. The ideal hash function has four main properties: (a) it is easy
to compute the hash for any given message, (b) it is extremely difficult to construct
a message that has a given hash, (c) it is extremely difficult to modify a given text
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without changing its hash, and (d) it is extremely difficult to find two different
messages with the same hash.
Because asymmetric ciphers tend to be significantly more computationally intensive,
they are usually used in combination with symmetric ciphers. In fact, the asymmetric
cipher is used to establish a shared key and the symmetric cipher is used to encrypt the
actual message using that shared key. This gives the benefits of asymmetric ciphers with
the speed of symmetric ciphers.
Security attacks can be divided into two types: passive and active attacks [19].
• Passive attack : A passive attacker attempts to eavesdrop the communication that
he is not supposed to hear, but he does not alter messages or break a system.
Traffic analysis is a type of passive attack that attempts to infer useful information
(e.g., the user’s identity, location, and communication frequency) without reading
the content.
• Active attack : An active attacker is actively attempting to harm to a network or
system. Thus, it is a more serious problem than the passive attack. For example,
an attacker can insert his own data into a message or delete a message. He can
playback the message from another connection or previous connection. A man-in-
the-middle attack is an example of active attacks. The attacker sits in the middle
of the communication link, intercepts messages and changes them with his own
messages. In this way, he tries to make the parties believe they are talking to each
other directly, while they really are talking to the attacker.
In order to protect the network and system against such attacks, there are five
fundamental properties (can be called the security requirements) as follows [20]:
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• Authentication: is to assure that communication is authentic. In other words,
authentication process is the process of proving one’s claimed identity. A basic
mechanism for this property is checking something you know (e.g., a username and
password) or checking something you have (e.g., fingerprint, smart card or voice
recognition) [22].
• Confidentiality : is to protect a message from disclosure to an unauthorized person.
Protecting the confidentiality of a message on a communication channel between
A and B means ensuring that no one other than A and B can read the message.
The principal mechanism for this is encryption [19].
• Integrity : is to assure that the received message has not been altered in any way
from the original. In practice, it is impossible to prevent an attacker who has
control of a communication channel from modifying a message. Thus, it actually
means ensuring that no one can modify the message without the intended receivers
noticing [22].
• Availability : means that any service or system should be available to an authorized
user when it is requested. The threat to availability is called denail-of-service (DoS)
[19]. DoS attacks attempt to inhibit normal use of communications facilities. One
common way is sending a lot of requests to the target device, such that it disturbs
the response to legitimate traffic, or it drains the battery [22].
• Non-repudiation: means that communication as well as content of the message can
not be denied by one of parties (the sender and receiver) later. Non-repudiation
of origin proves that data has been sent, and non-repudiation of delivery proves
that it has been received. In other words, when a message is sent, the receiver
can verify that the message was in fact sent by the party who claimed to send the
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message. When a message is received, the sender can verify that the message was
in fact received by the party who claimed to receive the message [19].
2.2.3. Authentication
This section discusses authentication techniques. Authentication is sometimes con-
fused with authorization. Usually, the authorization process is performed after authen-
tication. Authentication is the process of verifying a user’s identity while authorization
is the process of verifying whether that user has access to a specific resource [19].
The simplest authentication is to use passwords. A user proves his identity by trans-
mitting his password. This is what users normally do to log into a computer. Passwords
are stored on storage units and they become a valuable target to an attacker. Storing
the hashed passwords can solve this problem because an attacker can not reconstruct
any password from them easily. Despite this improvement, it is vulnerable to dictionary
attacks that try to derive a password from a list of words like a dictionary. Generally, dic-
tionary attacks succeed because most people often choose their passwords which are easy
to remember, short, and simple (e.g., common words or date). In addition, passwords
must be transmitted to the associated entities in a secure way. If a password or a hashed
password is transmitted in plaintext across a network, an attacker can record and replay
it later to impersonate her. Because the attacker does not need the actual password,
hashing does not offer protection. This kind of attack is called replay attack [21].
One time passwords are a possible solution for this problem. In this technique, the
password is valid for only one session or transaction. One time passwords are typically
generated as the output of an algorithm whose inputs are a seed, a counter, or clock [19].
An example technique is using a chain of hashed passwords [21]. Let a series of passwords
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be p0, p1, · · · , pn. Two entities involved in the authentication process use a hash of pi at
ith authentication step sequentially. Another example is a challenge-response technique.
In this technique, the authenticator sends a random callenge and then the peer returns
the response on that challenge. The response typically is the random challenge encrypted
with their shared key. Both peers must know the shared key and encryption algorithm
that will be used for this process, but the key must be unknown to all others [19].
Another way of authentication is using biometrics [23]. Biometric authentication is
a method of identifying a person on a physiological or behavioral characteristic. Phys-
iological characteristics include hand or finger images, facial characteristics, and iris
recognition. Behavioral characteristics are related to the behavior of a person such as
dynamic signature verification, speaker verification, and keystroke dynamics. Biometric
authentication technologies such as face, finger, hand, iris, and speaker recognition are
commercially available today and are already coming into wide use.
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3. MOBILE EDGE COMPUTING DEVICES (MECD)
This chapter will focus on designing the mobile gateway for USN. As discussed
in Section 1.1, USN consists of a huge number of end nodes that generate a consider-
ably large amount of sensing data. Accordingly, the interaction of the network is huge.
Furthermore, the mobility of nodes makes this problem more complicated. Therefore,
scalability is a critical problem in USN.
3.1. Motivation
In the case of USN, we observed that end nodes installed on a moving object such
as a person or vehicle are moving together and collaborating with each other. A mobile
gateway needs to be dedicated to one object can manage a local network of these end
nodes in a distributed manner. Such architectures scale well with increasing network size
and help to protect a local network from attacks outside of this network. For example,
a person wearing tens of health sensors on his body can have a mobile gateway that
manages all these sensor nodes and data generated by them. This local network is
managed seperately from external networks so that it will be more scalable and secure.
In a traditional wireless sensor network, the role of gateways is connecting end
nodes to remote servers. The gateway typically forwards raw data to a server that
processes data from various gateways. With rapid advance in computing and networking
technologies, the mobile gateway becomes increasingly more poweful and it can perform
increasingly more local data processing. Through the local data processing, the gateway
sends only necessary data to the server in order to reduce the amount of data sent from
an end node to the server.
In addition to the collaboration among sensor nodes within one object, there can
be interaction across objects for collaboration. In USN, however, most of collaboration
23
occurs locally. In other words, while the density of collaboration within an object re-
mains same, the collaboration between objects will decrease when one moves away [21].
Although there is still the need of communicating with the remote users/servers that are
located far away, local interaction/collaboration has preponderance. Instead of passing
data through the server, direct communication with currently neighboring objects can
decrease the number of remote communications and also reduce the response time.
Therefore, we design the mobile gateway called a Mobile Edge Computing Device
(MECD) for USN. An MECD is dedicated to a moving object in order to manage a
local network of end nodes that are associated with that object and process data locally
instead of the remote server. The examples of local data processing are alert generation,
event detection, and database management that are required for USN applications. Using
local data processing of mobile gateways and distributed network management, we can
improve scalability and security.
3.2. Functional Architecture of MECD
An MECD uses a component-based architecture because the modularity can help
to upgrade the system easily. MECDs must support the major functionalities of USN
applications: 1) monitoring of conditions, 2) tracking of mobile objects, and 3) detection
of events.
As shown in Fig. 7, an MECD consists of the following various components:
• Monitoring Process: gathers data from several end nodes (sensors and RFID de-
vices) as well as neighboring MECDs and expresses them in a summary form.
These data will be sent to the Alerting Process and the Database Management
components.
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Fig. 7. Block Diagram for MECDs.
• Alerting Process: analyzes data gathered by the Monitoring Process component
and generates an alert if there is an abnormal event or extreme condition. The
alert will be sent to the Local or Remote Communication Interface components
based on its type.
• External Query Process: translates a query command into a proper sensor query.
Based on the query type, the query will be sent to the other components such as
Local Communication Interface, Database Management, Network Management, or
Power Management. When the response generation module receives a response, it
generates a message in an appropriate format and then forwards the message to
the Remote Communication Interface component.
• Remote Communication Interface: links components of the MECD with the remote
server.
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• Local Communication Interface: connects components of the MECD to sensor
nodes, RFID devices, and neighboring MECDs.
• Network Management : provides tools to manage networks such as network config-
uration, routing, neighbor discovering, and bandwidth management.
• Database Management : helps to access the local database.
• Power Management : manages the sleeping mode and frequency of the periodic
reporting on the basis of end nodes’ battery status.
• Security Management : performs security protocols for key management, authenti-
cation, and encryption/decryption.
3.3. Prototype Implementation of MECD
To implement the MECD prototype, we use a CrossBow Stargate gateway [24].
The Stargate is a powerful single-board embedded Linux computer designed for wireless
sensor networking applications. The Stargate has low power consumption and various in-
terfaces such as USB, PCMCIA, Compact Flash (CF), and a 51-pin connector. Through
these interfaces, various communication and processing capabilities can be supported.
Fig. 8 shows our configuration of the Stargate. A CrossBow MicaZ mote [25] is
connected via a 51-pin connector for 2.4-GHz Zigbee communication, and the 802.11 CF
card provides remote WiFi access. The Stargate is loaded with a Postgres SQL database
system and a USB memory card to store the sensed data. Ethernet might be used for
maintenance, for example, updating a program or dumping data.
As shown in Fig. 9 indicates, our MECD prototype was packaged with waterproof
materials to ensure survivability in harsh environments. In the box, there is a Stargate
and a DC/DC converter that converts the input power to 5 V for the Stargate.
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Fig. 8. Configuration of the MECD Implementation.
Fig. 10 describes the software components of our MECD prototype and the data
flow between them. All software components were written in C.
With our configuration, the MECD communicates with the server through the
802.11 card driver. If the GPRS modem driver is installed, the MECD can also use
it for remote communication. Socket server daemons help to establish connection with
other devices.
Once the query is received from the server, the query manager component performs
the External Query Process described in the previous Section 3.2. On the basis of
the query type, the query is forwarded to the internal network abstract component
or the database management component. The internal network abstract component is
responsible for translating a query into an appropriate format as part of the External
Query Process. The formatted sensor query is then sent out to the sensor network. In
our configuration, the 51-pin serial port on the Stargate connects to the MicaZ mote.
Therefore, the serial forwarder provides a bridge between the serial port and the network.
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Fig. 9. Waterproof Package of the MECD implementation.
We use the C-based serial forwarder, sf, provided by Crossbow. The data aggregation
component performs the Monitoring Process. Collected data will be sent to the database
management to be stored along with the report components. The report component
and the external network abstraction component perform the Alerting Process. Radio
management is part of the Network Management and determines the outgoing wireless
interface dynamically when there are several available communication ways (e.g., 802.11,
Zigbee, or GPS). The decision can be based on resource availability, efficiency, and
network condition. We did not implement the radio management component at this
stage because our prototype uses only 802.11 WiFi for remote communication. However,
the future solution will include this functionality.
3.4. Case Study: Intelligent Container System
This section discusses the actual use of our MECD design in an intelligent container
application. Our intelligent container system is a comprehensive solution to provide end-
to-end visibility of cargo containers for homeland security as well as global supply chain
management.
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Fig. 10. Software Components and Data Flow for our MECD.
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3.4.1. Functional Requirements
An intelligent container requires the following functionalities:
• Container Integrity : is essential for homeland security and supply chain. To ensure
the container integrity, a container is sealed during transit. The system should be
able to detect an unauthorized door opening action and a breach on any side of a
container.
• Tracking : can be carried out in multiple levels such as containers, packages, or
items. The system must be able to support real-time tracking.
• Monitoring : of containers’ condition must be provided because abnormal condi-
tions such as extremely high temperature or humidity might cause damage to
containers or packages.
• History of Journey : must be maintained during a journey and can be any infor-
mation, including when, who, how, and what.
For more details, Section A.1 includes the requirements for homeland security driven by
government regulation.
Supporting these functional requirements by an MECD is straightforward. The
Monitoring Process component provides tracking and monitoring functionalities, and
the Alerting Process component supports alerts against container integrity. History of
journey is managed by the Database Management component. The other components
are also used for managing and helping these three components.
3.4.2. Test-bed Configuration
Fig. 11 depicts the configuration of our test-bed. Within the container, we deployed
several CrossBow MicaZ [25] and TelosB [26] motes. An MECD and an RFID Reader-
Mote module were installed on the container’s door. These devices inside the containder
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Fig. 11. Test-bed Configuration for the Intelligent Container System
were connected via 2.4-GHz Zigbee communication. Zigbee is used for networking local
gateways because of its low cost, low power, and wireless mesh-networking characteris-
tics [27]. A GUI was implemented on a PDA for remote control and monitoring. The
external network between the MECD and the remote servers (PDA) used 802.11 WiFi
communication.
3.4.3. Sensor Implementation
When a mote in the container is turned on, it broadcasts a beacon to find the
corresponding MECD. At this implementation stage, we assumed that there was only
one MECD during this initialization process, but the future implementation needs to
provide a way to find an appropriate MECD if the multiple MECDs can hear this beacon
message. Possible solutions are choosing the closest MECD or using a pre-deployed key
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to find an appropriate MECD. Once an MECD receives the beacon, it performs the
handshaking process, including synchronization, database update, and ID assignment.
3.4.4. Door Opening/Closing Detection
To save battery, our intelligent container system only triggers RFID readings when
the container door is open. To detect the door opening/closing action, we placed one
Crossbow MicaZ mote attached to Crossbow MTS300 sensor board [28]. This sensor
senses light in the container and notifies the MECD of a door opening or closing action
when the value is over or under the threshold (300 in hexadecimal), respectively. When
the MECD receives this event notification, it sends a Start Reading or Stop Readning
command to RFID readers associated with that container. For more accurate detection,
we can combine the information from light sensors with an electronic seal (E-seal) in the
future. In this paper, we call it the door-opening sensor.
3.4.5. Reader-Mote Module Implementation
For the Reader-Mote module implementation, we used the SkyeTek UHF M9
reader [29], which is a small, low power, cost-efficient, and globally compliant ultra-
high frequency (UHF) reader. The M9 RFID reader was integrated with the MicaZ
mote to provide Zigbee communication as well as the computation capability.
We connected the RS-232 serial port of the M9 reader and the UART of the Mi-
caZ mote through a converter cable shown in Fig. 12. This converter cable provides
two-way communication and voltage conversion between the 5-V M9 RFID reader and
the 3-V MicaZ mote. The MicaZ mote receives an external command, such as Setup,
Start Reading, or Stop Reading, from the MECD. The mote then translates it into an
appropriate command for the M9 reader and forwards a formatted command through
the UART. Our Reader-Mote module was also packaged with waterproof materials as
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Fig. 12. Configuration of the Reader-Mote implementation.
Fig. 13. Waterproof Package of the Reader-Mote implementation.
shown in Fig. 13. In the package, there is a SkyeTek M9 reader and a small antenna
that is a directional 902 - 928-MHz antenna with a 6-dBi gain.
Fig. 14 depicts the operation process of the RFID Reader-Mote module. During
the setup process, the administrator sends a command to change the RF frequency and
the output power of the RFID reader on the basis of the current location information.
This ensures compliance with regulated reading power levels and frequency bands in
different countries. Table I summarizes the regulations of the power level and frequency
bands [30]. The power is expressed either as EIRP (Effective Isotropic Radiated Power)
or ERP (Effective Radiated Power). Here, the European regulated power level of 2
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Fig. 14. Process Flow of RFID Readings.
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Table I. Government regulations for UHF RFID.
Region Power Levels Frequency Bands
Singapore 0.5 Watts ERP 866-869 MHz
Taiwan 0.5 Watts ERP 922-928 MHz
Philippines 0.5 Watts ERP 918-920 MHz
Europe, South Africa 2 Watts ERP 865.6-867.6 MHz
China 2 Watts ERP 840.5-844.5 MHz
U.S 4 Watts EIRP 902-928 MHz
Australia 4 Watts EIRP 920-926 MHz
New Zealand 4 Watts EIRP 864-868 MHz
Japan 4 Watts EIRP 952-954 MHz
South Korea 4 Watts EIRP 908.5-910 MHz
Watts ERP is equivalent to 3.28 Watts EIRP [31]. Ideally, we expect this process to be
automatic, and the future MECD implementation will use a GPS to obtain the current
location.
As mentioned in Section 3.4.4, the MECD sends Start Reading or Stop Reading
commands to the Reader-Mote module when it receives the message of Door Opening
or Door Closing events from the sensor attached on the container door. After a reading
is triggered, the M9 RFID reader immediately passes the RFID Tag information to the
MicaZ mote without any freshness checking. On the MicaZ mote of the Reader-Mote
module, the duplicated IDs are eliminated, and only fresh readings are sent out to the
MECD.
3.4.6. GUI Implementation
For the remote control, we implemented a GUI program called SGConsole using
Visual C#. Fig. 15 is the display of the SGConsole program running on a PDA.
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Fig. 15. PDA’s GUI for Remote Control.
To access a particular container, a user types the IP address of the MECD and then
presses the Connect button on the upper right corner of the screen. Once the connection
is established, data are displayed on the screen for remote monitoring.
At the bottom, there is the main menu: Stargate, RFID, and Console. The Star-
gate menu includes the sub-menus: Set Time, Shutdown, and Status. When a Stargate
(MECD) is turned on, the time is initialized by the Set Time sub-menu. The PDA
transmits the timestamp to the MECD and then receives feedback from the MECD. The
Shutdown sub-menu is used for shutting down the Stargate gracefully. The Status sub-
menu displays its current time, running processes, and free disk space. As mentioned,
the Reader-Mote module is turned on by a door-opening event. However, a user can
also turn it on manually by the RFID menu. It also supports to refresh the cache in the
Reader-Mote module. The Console menu is used for clearing the screen and exit.
3.4.7. Deployment
The test-bed was tested first in a stand-alone container over several months and
then in a 33 stacked container configuration to assess the inter-network interference
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Fig. 16. Route for the Test from Singapore to Taiwan.
Fig. 17. Actual Deployment in the Container.
and network communication strength. Section A.2 presents the experimental results in
details. Finally, we deployed our system for a multi-day shipment from Singapore to
Taiwan shown in Fig. 16.
Fig. 17 shows the installation of our equipment in a container. For this test, an
administrator sets the power level and frequency to the regulation of Singapore or Taiwan
using the PDA before opening a container door. The regulated power level is 0.5 W
ERP in both countries. The frequency is 866-869 MHz in Singapore and 922-928 MHz
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in Taiwan. With 0.5 W ERP, the average read range of our Reader-Mote module was
approximately 18 in. Therefore, we need to use multiple Reader-Mote modules to expand
the coverage. Each Reader-Mote module sends fresh readings to MECD, but there is a
chance of multiple readers reading the same RFID tag. To avoid duplication, the MECD
will perform a freshness check again.
Before we deployed our system, we examined the energy consumption of the Stargate
and the RFID reader. The Stargate with MicaZ and AmbiCom CF WiFi card attached
drew 406 mA of current, consuming a power of 1827 mW. The M9 RFID reader on single
reading drew 270 mA of current, consuming a power of 1215 mW, while a continuous
reading mode drew 615 mA of current, consuming a power of 2767.50 mW. To support the
shipment from Singapore to Taiwan, the Stargate (MECD) and Reader-Mote modules
were powered by a car-size battery. These modules were mounted on the container’s
wall, similar to the TelosB mote in Fig. 17.
Four TelosB motes were mounted on the four corners of the container; they measured
temperature and humidity every 5 min. The MECD stored all the collected data such as
temperature, humidity, and signal strength in its local database; these data were dumped
from the flash memory after shipment.
We successfully tested our single container configuration. However, we found that
the connectivity between a gateway and a server can be very low because of the physical
constraints (i.e. due to high interference from metal and dense materials in and around
the containers). In addition, the high temperature reduces the RF (radio frequency)
signal strength. Fig. 18 shows that the signal strength of two nodes in a container
decreases with an increase in the temperature. As shown in Fig. 18, the variation of
temperature is high, approximately 20 degrees Celsius within a day. Therefore, we need
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Fig. 18. Temperature and Signal Strength Changes during Shipment.
to consider these two issues for the system design of intelligent containers.
3.5. Related Work
In this section, we present a brief discussion on the recent works on mobile gateways.
Chen and Ma [32] addressed the problems of the static gateways in a wireless sensor
network. One of the key problems is that sensor nodes close to the gateway will die
quickly because they forward data from other nodes to the gateway. Further, the network
connectivity may not be guaranteed because of obstacles or sensor node failures. To solve
these problems, they have introduced an additional layer of mobile nodes such as mobile
phones, PDAs, and laptops with multiple communication capabilities.
Recently, researchers have paid attention to the mobile gateway, but the mobility
introduces new challenges such as re-routing and energy efficiency. In [33], Akkaya and
Younis have proposed an energy-aware routing scheme for mobile gateways. This scheme
aims to reduce the frequency of re-routing which in turn would reduce the overhead. In
this scheme, re-routing is triggered only when the distance of the gateway from the last
hop nodes becomes unacceptably large. Otherwise, the last hop nodes increase their
radio ranges to reach the gateway.
39
Shakya et al. have focused on maximizing the lifetime of a sensor network [34].
To balance the lifetime among nodes, they have proposed the distribution of the role of
forwarders among all N-hop neighbors of the gateway. As the gateway moves, it performs
a local reconfiguration of an N-hop neighborhood. Because of the local reconfiguration,
the re-routing cost can be reduced.
Many researchers have investigated various mechanisms to enhance energy efficiency
and network connectivity for a wireless sensor network, but we will focus on the needs
of mobile gateways for a USN to handle a tremendous amount of data generated by a
huge number of sensor nodes.
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4. MESH-NETWORKED MECDS
The gateway is responsible for connecting the end nodes to the remote server in
sensor networks. However, the mobile gateway in USN has a problem to communicate
with the server in some cases. For example, as shown in Fig. 19, containers are stacked
very closely and thus a container stacked at the bottom will not have a direct connection
to the server because of the physical constraints (i.e. due to high interference from
metal and dense materials in and around the containers). Moreover, containers can be
in a harsh environment (e.g., sea and desert) and Fig. 18 in Section 3.4.7 shows intense
temperature changes during shipment over sea. High temperature reduces signal strength
of RF signals and consequently will have a negative effect on connectivity between a
gateway and a server.
In order to solve this problem of unreachability, we propose the creation of a dynamic
mesh network among neighboring gateways so that they can collaborate in sending sensed
data to the server. This mesh-networking approach can support reliable connectivity by
redundant paths between the nodes.
4.1. System Design
This section discusses our system design and the system requirements of this mesh
networking approach.
Fig. 19. Cargo Containers stacked in a Container Yard.
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4.1.1. System Architecture
This section presents our hierarchical system architecture that is designed to support
different levels of collaborations in an efficient way. To design USN applications, we must
consider the following requirements.
• Scalability : In USN, there are a considerable number of devices especially end
nodes. The system should be able to handle an increasing amount of data generated
by a huge number of end nodes.
• Reliability : The system can be deployed in harsh environments and therefore nodes
or links can fail. In such harsh environments, however, an end node should be able
to send a message to a server even though there are some node or link failures. In
other words, end-to-end communication should be reliable.
Under these requirements, we design a 3-level hierarchical network as shown in Fig. 20.
The three levels are as follows:
• Server-level : Servers collect data from end nodes and send query commands to
them through MECDs. Servers are connected so that they can collaborate on the
basis of the interests or needs of applications.
• MECD-level : An MECD performs two types of operations. First, the MECD
gathers data sensed by end nodes and send high-level data to the server. On
the other hand, the MECD receives a command from the server, interprets it, and
sends a formatted command to the end nodes. In order to support these operations
efficiently, MECDs create a dynamic mesh network with neighboring MECDs and
collaborate via this network.
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Fig. 20. Hierarchical Network Structure.
• Sensor-level : End nodes can be sensors and RFID devices with wireless communi-
cation capability. They monitor surroundings or objects and send sensing data to
the MECD.
This 3-level network is designed to support multi-level collaboration. Because all net-
works are managed in a distributed manner, this hierarchical structure can reduce the
effects of the growth in one network on other level networks. Further, the system is
efficient in terms of bandwidth and energy because MECDs can reduce the amount of
data to be transmitted to the server. The system can be easily enlarged by adding a
few MECDs although the number of end nodes increases considerably. Therefore, this
hierarchical architecture can deliver scalability to the system. In our architecture, sensor-
level and MECD-level networks use mesh networking. Because of the redundant paths in
mesh networks, reliability can be improved. In addition, the MECD has multiple com-
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munication capabilities such as Zigbee, Bluetooth, WiFi, satellite, and cellular networks
to communicate with the server. It selects one of the available networks dynamically on
the basis of not only the system requirements (e.g., transmission range and bandwidth)
but also the network conditions. Such alternative networks or paths can help reliable
communication from an end node to a server.
4.1.2. System Requirements of MECD-level Networks
In this section, we will focus on the MECD-level network proposed in this paper.
The requirements of the MECD-level network are as follows:
• Server reachability : As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, some MECDs
(e.g., the container’s MECD stacked at the bottom) are not able to communicate
with the server directly. The MECD-level network is used for helping commu-
nication between the server and MECDs that do not have a direct connection.
Therefore, this MECD-level network must support the ability to reach the server
from any MECD in the system.
• Network latency : In this study, our targeted applications are real-time tracking
and monitoring applications. However, this MECD-level network can introduce
additional delay to transmit a message via multi-hop routes. The increase in the
delay created by the MECD-level network should be acceptable.
• Energy efficiency : Similarly, MECDs will consume additional energy to route mes-
sages sent by other neighboring MECDs. Since MECDs have limited energy, the
total power consumption of this network is low.
In order to meet these requirements, there are issues that need to be considered:
• Network size/density : The size and density of MECD-level networks depend on
applications and situations. Because the network size and density significantly
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affect the network latency and energy consumption, they are important factors
with respect to the evaluation of the MECD-level network.
• Temperature: Bannister et al. [35] found that the signal strength between two
nodes decreases as the temperature increases. The signal strength affects the server
reachability, network latency, and energy consumption of the network. Therefore,
the temperature condition of the real environments should be considered.
4.2. Evaluation
In Section 3.4.7, we showed that our system was successfully tested in a single
container configuration. However, testing the MECD-level network in an actual environ-
ment is challenging because there are many factors to be considered. First, the density of
MECD-level networks depends on the size of the cargo containers. The network density
has a significant effect on connectivity between two MECDs. Therefore, to evaluate the
server reachability, we need to consider different container sizes. Further, the size of
the MECD-level networks depends on the capacity of ships, trains, and container yards.
Obviously, a large network size increases the network latency as well as the total en-
ergy consumption of the MECD-level network. Finally, the temperature that affects the
server reachability, network latency, and total energy consumption varies considerably
during the shipment.
In this section, we will discuss simulation for the MECD-level network with different
container sizes, network sizes, and temperatures.
4.2.1. Simulation Setup
To set up the network of containers [36], we use the International Standards Orga-
nization (ISO) standards. There are five common ISO standard lengths: 20 ft. (6.1 m),
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Fig. 21. Simulation Setup for ISO Containers.
40 ft. (12.2 m), 45 ft. (13.7 m), 48 ft. (14.6 m), and 53 ft. (16.2 m) [36]. The height of
the containers varies from 4.25 ft. to 9.5 ft. However, the typical container height is 8.5
ft. (2.6 m) [37] [38]. The standard width of containers used in international commerce
is 8 ft. (2.44 m) [37] [38].
Fig. 21 shows the network setup for the simulation. We assume that the MECD is
attached at the center of each container door. In this simulation, we use the fixed values
of 8 ft. for the container width and 8.5 ft. for the container height. Typically, the space
between the containers is less than 1 ft. [39]. Therefore, we assume that the distances
between the MECDs are 2.7 m (approximately, 8.86 ft. = 8 ft. wide + 0.86 ft. space) in
width and 2.6 m in height. For the length, we consider 5 common ISO standard lengths
and l denotes the distance between the MECDs in length (the container length + the
space) in meters.
L, M, and N are the number of containers on the x-axis, y-axis, and z-axis, respec-
tively. Typically, up to six shipping containers are stacked on top of one another [39].
Therefore, N is fixed as 6 for simplicity. L and M depend on the environment where the
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containers are stacked (e.g., container yard, ship, train, and port).
4.2.2. Communication Model
In this simulation, we assume that all MECDs have same communication and pro-
cessing capability. One MECD can directly communicate with other MECDs within the
maximum communication range, but it cannot directly communicate with MECDs out
of this range.
First, we estimate the maximum communication range between two MECDs using
the Log-Distance Path Loss model. The Log-Distance Path Loss model is a popular
radio propagation model to predict the path loss on a link with respect to distance and
environment [40]. The received power at distance d is expressed as follows:
Pr(d) = Pr(0)− 10np log(d/d0) +Xσ, (4.1)
where Pr(0) is the received power measured at the reference distance d0 and np is the path
loss exponent. Xσ is a zero-mean normally distributed random variable with standard
deviation σ.
The temperature loss in dB is defined as follows:
TL(T ) = 0.1996(T − 25), (4.2)
where T is the temperature in Celsius with the range 25◦C ≤ T ≤ 65◦C [35]. Using
Equation 4.1 and 4.2, we can define the maximum communication range as the maximum
value d that satisfies the inequality:
Pr(d)− TL(T ) ≥ Ps, (4.3)
where Ps is the radio sensitivity [35].
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In this simulation, we use d0 = 1 m, Pr(0) = -45 dBm, σ = 3 dBm, and Ps =
-94 dBm that are widely used for wireless sensor networks [35]. The parameter, np,
depends on the environment, and we use the value of 3.3 for metal materials of cargo
containers [41].
4.2.3. Energy Consumption Model
The energy to transmit a 1-bit message to a distance of 100 m has been found
to be equal to the energy required to process 3000 instructions [42]. Therefore, in this
simulation, the energy required for processing data is mostly ignored, and only the energy
consumption for communication is considered.
We use a simple radio model called the first-order radio model to compute the
total energy consumption of packet transmission and reception over distance [43]. In
this model, it is assumed that the energy consumption to run the transmitter circuitry,
ETx−elec, and receiver circuitry, ERx−elec, are the same. When the distance is d, a d2
energy loss is assumed for channel transmission. The energy consumption in transmitting
a k-bit data packet to a distance d is defined as follows:
ETx(k, d) = ETx−elec(k) + ETx−amp(k, d) = Eelec × k + εamp × k × d2, (4.4)
where Eelec is the energy consumption to run the transmitter or receiver circuitry and
εamp is the energy consumed by the transmitting amplifier. We used Eelec = 50 nJ/bit
and εamp = 100 pJ/nit/m2; these are the widely used values for wireless networks [42] [43].
The energy consumption in receiving a k-bit data packet is defined as follows:
ERx(k) = ERx−elec(k) = Eelec × k. (4.5)
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Using equations 4.4 and 4.5, we define the total energy consumption to transmit a
k-bit data packet over n hops:
Etotal(k, n) = n× (ETx(k, d) + ERx(k)) = n× (2k × Eelec + εamp × k × d2). (4.6)
4.2.4. Metrics and Measurement Methods
In this section, we will discuss how to measure the server reachability, network
latency, and energy efficiency.
In the case of the intelligent container system, the container at the top of the stack
has a clear line-of-sight. Therefore, we assume that the MECD located on the top
corner can communicate with the server directly. This MECD called the forwarder is
responsible for forwarding the packets from the other MECDs to the server.
1. Server Reachability
In the simulation, we first compute the location of each MECD with a given length
(l). Using Equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, we calculate the maximum communication
range with the given network density and temperatures. On the basis of that range,
we determine whether an MECD has a direct link with other MECDs. In other
words, we determine whether two MECDs are within that range.
Using the link information, we compute the connectivity and the server reachability
for all MECDs in the network.
Definition 4.2.1 (Connectivity (Ci)) The connectivity represents the ability to
send a packet from a specific MECD to the forwarder. The connectivity of MECD
i, Ci is 1 if there is at least one possible path between MECD i and the forwarder.
Otherwise, Ci is 0. Note that a path can be multiple hops.
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Definition 4.2.2 (Server Reachability(SR)) The server reachability, SR,
denotes the ratio of the number of MECDs that can reach the server through the
MECD-level network to the total number of MECDs in the network. The server
reachability, SR, is defined as follows:
SR =
∑
i∈S Ci
L×M ×N × 100, (4.7)
where S is the set of MECDs in the network. Note that L ×M × N is the total
number of MECDs in the network.
As discussed in Section 4.2, the temperature and the network density have signifi-
cant effects on server reachability. We use T = 25◦C, 45◦C, and 65◦C considering
temperature changes during the actual shipment. In the intelligent container sce-
nario, the network density changes with a change in the distance between the
MECDs with respect to the length, l. Considering the ISO container lengths and
the space between MECDs, we use the range of 5 m ≤ l ≤ 30 m. However,
the network density remains same with a change in the total number of MECDs.
Therefore, L, M, and N are fixed as 6 for calculating SR.
2. Network Latency
To evaluate network latency, we measure the average path length at different values
of T, L×M ×N , and l. In this simulation, the average path length is defined as
the average number of hops along the shortest paths between the forwarder and all
other MECDs in the network. The average path length is an important factor to
evaluate the performance of the MECD-level networks because the network latency
can be expressed as a function of the path length.
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On the basis of the link information between MECDs, we find the shortest paths
between the forwarder and all the other MECDs and then calculate the average
path length.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, N is fixed as 6 for simplicity. L and M are changed
from 6 to 20 to see the effects of these changes on the average path length at T
= 25◦C, 45◦C, and 65◦C. Since 45 ft. long containers are not commonly used in
international commerce [37] [38], we fix l = 6.4 m, 12.5 m, 14.94 m, and 16.46 m
(20 ft., 40 ft., 48 ft. and 53 ft. with 1 ft. space).
3. Energy Efficiency
To evaluate energy efficiency, we measure the total energy consumption at different
values of T, L ×M × N , and l. The values of T, L ×M × N , and l are same as
the simulation of the network latency discussed above.
In this simulation, we assume that every node in the network sends a packet to
the forwarder via its shortest path. The packet size, k = 20 bytes is the same as
that of our test-bed system. Considering the values of parameters in Section 4.2.2,
we estimate the ideal maximum transmission range to be approximately 50 m in
IEEE 802.15.4 Zigbee [44]. Therefore, we use d = 50 m in equation 4.6.
Even though the ideal maximum transmission range at these parameters is ap-
proximately 50 m, the actual maximum communication range can be reduced by
increasing the temperature. We have already calculated the actual maximum com-
munication range and the shortest path lengths from each node to the forwarder at
T = 25◦C, 45◦C, and 65◦C for the simulation of network latency discussed above.
Therefore, we use n = the shortest path length of each node for 4.6. Using 4.6, we
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Fig. 22. Server Reachability with Different Distances between MECDs in Length (l)
and Temperature (T).
compute Etotal for every MECD and sum them for the total energy consumption
of the MECD-level network.
4.2.5. Simulation Results
Fig. 22 shows SR with the range 5 m ≤ l ≤ 30 m and T = 25◦C, 45◦C, 65◦C.
At T = 25◦C, SR is 100%, but at T = 45◦C and 65◦C, SR is less than 100% after a
certain distance (l ≥ 28 m with T = 45◦C and l ≥ 22.5 m with T = 65◦C). However,
ISO standard container lengths with 1 ft. space are less than 16.5 m. Therefore, we
can conclude that the MECD-level network can provide 100% server reachability for ISO
standard containers within the range 25◦C ≤ T ≤ 65◦C when the containers are closely
stacked.
For the simulation in this dissertation, we set the path loss exponent, np to the
value of 3.3 for metal materials as mentioned in Section 4.2.2. However, in order to
see the effects of np values on SR, we calculated SR with different np values and T =
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Fig. 23. Server Reachability with Different Path Loss Exponents (np) and Temperatures
(T) when Distance between MECDs in Length (l) = 16.46m.
25◦C, 45◦C, 65◦C. This simulation used l = 16.49m as the longest length of common
ISO containers. Fig. 23 show that SR becomes less than 100% when np ≥ 4.5. However,
np is 2 for the free space and typically between 3 and 4 [45]. In conclusion, the complete
server reachability for ISO standard containers within the range 25◦C ≤ T ≤ 65◦C can
be achieved.
Fig. 24, 25, and 26 present the average path lengths with different values of L ×
M×N and l when T is 25◦C, 45◦C, or 65◦C, respectively. From these figures, we can see
that the average path length gradually increases when the number of MECDs increases
considerably. Further, to conclude, the MECD-level network will produce a small amount
of additional delays and is scalable to a large size of MECD networks.
Fig. 27, 28, and 29 show the total energy consumption at different values of L×M×
N and l and l when T is 25◦C, 45◦C, or 65◦C, respectively. From these figures, we can
see that the total energy consumption gradually increases when the number of MECDs
increases considerably. Further, to conclude, the MECD-level network will consume a
53
216 500 1000 1500 2000 2400
0
2
4
6
8
10
Network Size [number of MECDs]
A
vg
 P
at
h 
Le
ng
th
 [n
um
be
r 
of
 h
op
s]
Path Length vs Network Size
 
 
l = 6.4m
l = 12.5m
l = 14.94m
l = 16.46m
Fig. 24. Average Path Length with Temperature (T) = 25◦C, Different Network Sizes
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Fig. 25. Average Path Length with Temperature (T) = 45◦C, Different Network Sizes
(L×M ×N) and Distances between MECDs in Length (l).
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Fig. 26. Average Path Length with Temperature (T) = 65◦C, Different Network Sizes
(L×M ×N) and Distances between MECDs in Length (l).
small amount of additional power and is scalable to a large size of MECD networks.
For the simulation above, we used Pr(0) = -45 dBm. For MicaZ motes, the received
signal power at distance 1m, Pr(0) can be calculated as follows [46]:
Pr(0) = Pt − 40.2, (4.8)
where Pt is the transmission power in dBm. Because the transmission power of MicaZ
is between 0 dBm and -25 dBm [25], -65.2 dBm ≤ Pr(0) ≤ -40.2 dBm.
This dissertation used Pr(0) = -45 dBm which is almost the maximum transmission
power of MicaZ for the simulation because this number is a typical value for wireless
sensor networks. However, from the results shown in Fig. 24, 25, and 26, we found that
the average path lengths were usually small. Especially, with the small distance and
network size, the average path lengths were about 1. That means the most of MECDs
are within the communication range of the forwarder with Pr(0) = -45 dBm.
Due to this observation, we found that the maximum transmission power may
not need for the complete SR. Therefore, we tried to reduce the transmission power
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Fig. 27. Total Energy Consumption with Temperature (T) = 25◦C, Different Network
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Fig. 28. Total Energy Consumption with Temperature (T) = 45◦C, Different Network
Sizes (L×M ×N) and Distances between MECDs in Length (l).
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Fig. 29. Total Energy Consumption with Temperature (T) = 65◦C, Different Network
Sizes (L×M ×N) and Distances between MECDs in Length (l).
of MECDs to communicate with the forwarder while SR is still 100%. We calculated SR
with every 2.5 dBm of Pr(0) from -65.2 dBm to -40.2 dBm. Fig. 30 shows the minimum
transmssion power to support the complete SR with different temperatures and distances
between MECDs in length. The results indicate that 100% SR can be achieved with a
lower transmission power than the maximum transmission power. Specifically, when l =
6.4 m, the minimum transmission power of MicaZ is enough to support the complete SR
for 25◦C ≤ T ≤ 65◦C. Even with l = 16.46 m and T = 65◦C (the worst case), -12.5 dBm
can support 100% SR and the maximum transmission power (0 dBm) is not needed.
However, there is a trade-off between the energy consumption and the network
latency. To see the effects of the transmission power of one node on the network latency,
we calculated the average path legnths for different transmission powers with T = 25
◦C, 45 ◦C, and 65 ◦C and different container lenghts (l = 6.4 m, 12.5 m, 14.96 m, and
16.46 m). Fig. 31, 32, 33, and 34 show the results when the number of MECDs in the
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Fig. 30. Minimum Transmission Power for Complete Server Reachability with Different
Temperatures (T) and Distances between MECDs in Length (l).
network is 216. As shown in these figures, the average path lengths could increase as the
transmission power decreases.
Although a sender can save the energy to transmite a packet by decreasing the
transmission power, the overall energy consumption can increase. This is because the
intermediate MECDs spend additional transmission and reception power. Fig. 35, 36, 37,
and 38 show the trend in the total energy consumption with the changes of the trans-
mission power. As shown in these figures, the total energy consumption decreases as the
transmission power decreases until the certain transmission power level (e.g., -20 dBm
with T = 25 ◦C and l = 6.4 m). However, after that level, the total energy consumption
starts increasing even though the transmission power decreases. Therefore, we need to
dynamically adjust the transmission power level based on the temperature and container
lengths.
4.3. Related Work
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Fig. 31. Average Path Length with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 6.4 m.
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Fig. 32. Average Path Length with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 12.5 m.
59
0 −2.5 −5 −7.5 −10 −12.5 −15 −17.5 −20 −22.5 −25
1
2
3
4
5
6
Transmission Signal Power [dBm]
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
at
h 
Le
ng
th
 [n
um
be
r 
of
 h
op
s]
Transmission Power vs Network Latency
 
 
T = 25 C
T = 45 C
T = 65 C
Fig. 33. Average Path Length with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 14.94 m.
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Fig. 34. Average Path Length with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 16.46 m.
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Fig. 35. Total Energy Consumption with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 6.4 m.
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Fig. 36. Total Energy Consumption with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 12.5 m.
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Fig. 37. Total Energy Consumption with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 14.94 m.
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Fig. 38. Total Energy Consumption with Different Temperatures (T) and Transmission
Powers when Distances between MECDs in Length (l) = 16.46 m.
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In this section, we will briefly discuss the existing intelligent container systems
targeted in our test and simulation.
Today, there are more than 20 million cargo containers moving around the world
each day [47]. Cargo containers transport 90% of the world’s trade and more than 10
million cargo containers enter U.S. ports each year. However, some reports have stated
that only 5 percent can be inspected with today’s capability [48]. Since the events of 9/11,
numerous government regulations, initiatives, and mandates have emerged for security
of cargo containers, including: Automated Targeting System (ATS) [49], Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) [50], Container Security Initiative (CSI) [51],
and Smart & Secure Trade lanes (SST) [52].
Therefore, there have been several efforts by the government, industry and academia
to develop the intelligent container system that remotely monitors the container’s con-
tents along with its condition and location using advanced technologies.
L-3 Communications [53] in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has developed a system to ensure the container’s integrity in transit using sensors
and fusion techniques.
ODIN Technologies [54] has introduced an RFID solution called S.M.A.R.T. (Secure
Material Accounted in Real Time) for the asset tracking of a supply chain. It reads RFID
tags of items inside the container and transmits data to the server. Savi Technology [55]
and AVANTE Technology [56] have used the RFID technology for asset tracking and
have coupled RFID with GPS to support real-time locating systems (RTLS).
Jedermann et al. [57] have proposed a combination of RFID with sensor networks
for the advanced tracking and monitoring of a supply chain.
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5. AUTHENTICATION FOR ENS
Authentication is one of the common security services as discussed in Section 2.2.2.
This process is necessary in ENS because it allows verification of the user’s identity
before access to resources and services via networks can be granted. For example, con-
sidering the example scenarios in Section 1.2.1, most devices are connected over wireless
networks. Wireless networks are more vulnerable than wired networks because of the
broadcast nature of wireless communications. Therefore, we need to protect the sensitive
data transmitted. In the case of smart space, the data transmitted between devices can
be confidential documents or personal contact information. Suppose a neighbor has a
powerful antenna and sits within the communication range. Then, he can easily eaves-
drop and learn the secret data. More serious forms of attacks are active attacks that
attempt to modify the data or access resources. For example, a thief could turn off
a security alarm in the house to enter. Obviously, a legitimate user does not want to
allow other people to hear his communication, and access his resources. Therefore, the
ENS requires an authentication process before communication, collaboration and access
grant.
5.1. Motivation
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the existing authentication mechanisms for traditional
computing environments are based on the user input (e.g., password or PIN), the trusted-
third party (e.g., public key infrastructure or a key distribution centre), or information
derived from a personal characteristic (e.g., biometrics). In the ENS, however, these tra-
ditional authentication mechanisms are not appropriate and the authentication becomes
a challenging problem because mutually unknown devices/users must verify each other’s
identity.
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5.1.1. Requirements
Authentication for ENS should meet the following requirements.
• Scalability : In ENSs, the number of devices will increase tremendously. The tra-
ditional authentication techniques generally assume that there is a pre-established
secret such as a password, key, or biometric information. This assumption is not
applicable to ENS because of the possibility of communicating with strangers. It is
impossible to manage a pre-established secret with all other devices in the world.
Therefore, the traditional mechanisms will not scale to the huge computing envi-
ronment [58].
• Invisibility : The ideal solution for the pervasive computing should be transparent
to users [59]. Thus, the authentication should be an automatic and seamless process
running in the background with minimal user interaction. The traditional ways to
get authenticated that involve human interactions such as presenting passwords or
biometrics (e.g. fingerprint or voice) are not suitable.
• Autonomy : In ENS, there is no fixed infrastructure. The authentication scheme
through the trusted third party or centralized server is not feasible for this envi-
ronment [60]. The authentication process for ENS should be autonomous.
• Heterogeneity : ENS consists of a wide range of devices from sensors to PCs and
they have different capabilities in terms of computation, communication and other
hardware resources (e.g. sensors). The authentication mechanism should be flexi-
ble to handle these heterogeneous devices.
• Resource Constraints: One of the characteristics of ENSs is resource constraint
in terms of computation, communication, and energy. Most of devices do not
have capability to perform expensive algorithms such as asymmetric algorithms or
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authentication protocols including several message transmissions. Therefore, the
authentication process should be efficient in terms of computation, communication,
and energy.
5.1.2. Location-based Authentication
In many ENS applications, users/devices commonly form social groups to collabo-
rate with others [61]. The group membership is changed based on some social context,
such as the user’s location, identity or interest. Currently, the location is the most widely-
used type of context for various applications. There are many examples of location-based
services such as location-based billing, location-based authentication, resource tracking,
and location-based mobile advertising.
Considering the proposed architecture in Section 4.1.1, an MECD can manage a
shared key with each end node in its sensor-level network and use these pre-shared keys
for authentication. However, authenticating other neighboring MECDs for collaboration
becomes problematic. MECDs can move anywhere and meet any unknown MECD that
they have never seen before. Maintaining shared keys with all MECDs in ubiquitous
environments is not possible.
To solve this problem, we can take the localized collaboration characteristic of
MECD-level networks. In other words, the current location information can be used
to authenticate a device in order to join a local network and collaborate with other de-
vices. In this work, we focus on the Location-based Authentication problem which is the
process to prove one’s identity and authenticity by detecting its current location [62].
One of the challenging problems in location-based authentication is how to deter-
mine the location of a node. In [62], GPS technique is used to determine the node’s
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physical location. However, putting GPS receivers in every node or manually configur-
ing locations is not cost effective. Also, it is difficult to use in indoor environment.
There are many localization (also called location determination) schemes that have
been proposed in the literature to allow nodes to estimate their locations using informa-
tion transmitted by a set of reference nodes that know their own locations. Localization
techniques can have different approaches: distance bounding, in-region, and absolute lo-
cation [63]. The absolute location approach is used to determine the entity’s absolute
location. The distance bounding approach determines whether the entity is closer to the
verifier than some distance or not. In the in-region approach, it determines whether the
entity is inside a certain delimited region or not.
Most of localization research has been on the assumption of an absence of mali-
cious nodes in a designated area. However, the truthfulness of the location information
is a critical aspect [64]. There have been some works recently on secure location ver-
ification [65] [66] [67] [68] [69]. Secure location verification techniques can be catego-
rized into two categories: range-dependent and range-independent techniques [70] [63].
Range-dependent schemes measure physical properties of the exchanged signals such as
time of arrival (TOA) [68], the angle of arrival (AOA) [69], and received signal strength
(RSS) [65]. On the other hand, range-independent schemes use other characteristics such
as the existence of beacon signals [67] and physical channels [66]. These approaches do
not require any measurements to be taken. Usually, range-dependent techniques pro-
vide more accurate location estimation, but are more expensive than range-independent
techniques. Therefore, range-dependent techniques are used for absolute location ap-
proaches while range-independent techniques are generally used for the in-region or dis-
tance bounding location estimation.
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The existing schemes require reference nodes which already know their location,
pre-established trust relationships with reference nodes, or additional hardware (e.g., a
directional antenna). However, the assumption of the existence of trusted reference nodes
is not applicable to a pervasive computing environment. The need of additional hardware
is also inappropriate because of the cost constraint of embedded devices. Therefore, we
need a new solution where the entity’s location is securely verified for ENSs.
5.2. Goals and Assumptions
In this work, we focus on applications which require authentication based on the
user’s current location. Especially, in our targeted applications described in Section 1.2.1,
a device should be within a particular area (e.g., a room, office, classroom, ship, port,
or container yard) in order to join a local network and collaborate with other devices.
Therefore, we use the in-region approach to solve the location-based authentication prob-
lem.
5.2.1. Problem Definition and Assumptions
We define a self-organizing region-based authentication problem as follows:
Definition 5.2.1 (Self-organizing Region-based Authentication Problem) A
verifier v automatically authenticates a requester r when they are in a region R of
interest. The region, R may be a room, a house, a building, a ship, a yard or other
physical areas.
Through this work, we assume that the requester claims that they present in a
particular region of interest R rather than a particular point of location. This region, R
must have some sort of physical control to restrict people into this area. In other words,
only authorized people are allowed to enter this area. We assume that v verifies local
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region claims rather than all region claims. If v is currently in the region R1, then it
must be able to verify whether r is in R1 or not. However, verifying other locations is
not required.
Definition 5.2.2 (Co-located) When v and r are present in the same region R, we
call them co-located.
The verifier v and the requester r are mobile nodes with wireless communication
capability. If r sends a message to v, v must be able to receive it and then v and s
both must behave according to the protocol. v will accept r if they are co-located and r
behaves according to the protocol. Otherwise, v will reject r’s claim.
We assume r and v are well-synchronized. There are several time synchronization
algorithms available in the literature [71]. In [71] [72], 1 µsec high-precision clock can
be achieved using small wireless sensors. We assume all devices use this synchronization
technique to support an approximate 1 µsec high-precision clock.
The authentication must be an automatic process without any help. In other words,
there must be no human involvement so that a user can concentrate on his or her work.
Furthermore, r and p do not need any pre-shared information or pre-established trust
relationship.
5.2.2. Threat Model
By this assumption, the adversary should not actually have any presence in the
region R. However, all nodes may be malicious. In this work, we consider the active
adversary model. The attacker can capture, record, intercept, replay or insert any mes-
sage in the wireless communication medium using a powerful antenna. Therefore, the
attacker can record the previous communications and replay valid packets to pair with
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other legitimate nodes as replay attack. In addition, there is the attacker guessing valid
packets in order to get authenticated. The attacker can also try to impersonate a legit-
imate node by intercepting all messages between legitimate nodes and injecting a new
message. It is known as a man-in-the-middle attack.
5.3. Self-organizing Authentication using Environmental Sounds
In this work, we suggest taking the cyber-physical approach in order to solve the
self-organizing region-based authentication problem. Recently, researchers have taken a
cyber-physical approach to security [73] and the cyber-physical security solution is the
integration of the security solution with the physical processes. In this approach, a secret
is generated from physical environments and used to verify the identity of a device/user.
Sensing information such as light, temperature, WiFi signal strength, and sound can
be a candidate for this approach. In this work, however, we propose to use environmental
sounds to take the advantages of the following facts.
• Environmental sound is physical context which is not input by a user.
• Devices within the particular region hear a similar environmental sound.
• A microphone is very cheap and many contemporary devices in embedded network
systems are equipped with a microphone.
• Environmental sound is produced by random events in any physical location in any
frequency range.
The hypothesis is that if we can find an acoustic feature(s) which is only known by
co-located devices at a given time, it can be used for authentication.
5.3.1. Research Questions
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Fig. 39. Overall Authentication Procedure using Acoustic Features.
To identify research questions for this problem, we classify an overall procedure
that is necessary for an acoustic feature-based authentication technique. Fig. 39 shows
how our authentication process works. There are four phases; Record, Feature Extrac-
tion, Feature Exchange and Verification. Suppose DeviceA wants to initialize commu-
nication with DeviceB. First, DeviceA sends the request. Then, both DeviceA and
DeviceB record sound and extract features from recorded sound. After feature extrac-
tion, DeviceA and DeviceB exchange the features and compare them. If features are
similar, authentication is done successfully. Otherwise, authentication fails.
1. Record Phase: As we discussed in Section 5.2.1, we assume that DeviceA and
DeviceB are synchronized well (within approximate 1 µsec). Thus, a synchroniza-
tion problem is not our concern.
The sampling rate is one of the critical factors in the record phase. By the Nyquist
theorem, we must have at least two samples in each cycle: one measuring the
positive part of the wave and one measuring the negative part. More than two
samples per cycle increases the amplitude accuracy, but less than two samples will
cause the frequency of the wave to be completely missed. Because audio data
consists of time series which are usually quite large, storing and computing them
is costly, especially for resource-limited embedded devices. Obviously, there is the
trade-off between accuracy and efficiency.
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Sampling duration is another important factor in this phase. Apparently, longer
sampling duration can improve the accuracy of this technique, but cause delay.
In pervasive applications, however, authentication should not interrupt users or
the other services. There is also the trade-off between accuracy and delay. Thus,
the experimental study is necessary to determine appropriate sampling rate and
duration.
2. Feature Extraction Phase: The feature extraction phase analyzes the incoming
waveform and extracts certain features from it. The acoustic feature should support
the following requirements to be used for the region-based authentication problem.
• Distinctiveness: The acoustic feature(s) should be able to distinguish co-
located devices from non co-located devices. In other words, when DeviceA
and DeviceB are co-located, they should share the common feature(s). But, if
DeviceA and DeviceB are not co-located, the feature(s) derived by DeviceA
should differ from DeviceB.
• Randomness and Time variance: The acoustic feature(s) should be random
so that no one can predict it. Furthermore, the acoustic feature(s) should
vary over time to avoid reusability.
There have been many studies on the acoustic feature extraction in speech recog-
nition and classification. However, the algorithm should be inexpensive in terms
of computation and energy for resource-limited mobile devices in ENS.
3. Feature Exchange Phase: The next question is how to exchange features se-
curely against possible attacks defined in Section 5.2.2. If two co-located devices
extract the exact same feature with high randomness and time-variance, it can be
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directly sent because it can not be re-used by an attacker. However, it is very diffi-
cult to get identical acoustic features that are perfectly random and time-variant.
Therefore, we need a secure way to exchange acoustic features even if they are not
perfectly identical, random, and time-variant.
4. Verification Phase: After exchanging extracted features, two devices will verify
whether they are co-located or not based on the similarity of acoustic features.
The question on this phase is how to measure similarity. The requirement for this
verification process is that it should be able to reject a request of non co-located
devices so that only devices within the same region can be authenticated by each
other.
5.3.2. Experimental Study: Acoustic Feature Extraction
Feature extraction can be categorized into two types: time-domain (temporal) and
frequency-domain (spectral) feature extraction. Time-domain features are calculated
directly from the original sound waveform. Frequency-domain feature extraction first
transforms the sound waveform to the frequency domain using Fourier transform and
then calculates the features from transformed signal [74].
The Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR) and Short Time Energy (STE) are the most widely
used time domain features. ZCR is a number of zero-crossing in a frame. A zero-crossing
occurs when adjacent samples have different signs [75]. The ZCR is defined for the single
frame as
ZCRn =
1
2N
∞∑
m=−∞
|sgn(x(m))− sgn(x(m− 1))|w(n−m), (5.1)
where x(m) is a discrete audio signal, n is the time index of ZCR, and w(m) is the
window of length N .
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Fig. 40. Experimental Setup.
sgn(x(m)) =

1, ifx ≥ 0
−1, otherwise
STE is defined as:
En =
1
N
∞∑
m=−∞
[x(m)w(n−m)]2, (5.2)
Generally, the amplitude of unvoiced speech segments is much lower than the amplitude
of voiced segments. The energy of the speech signal provides a representation that reflects
these amplitude variations [76].
For frequency-domain analysis, Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) is widely used
in signal processing to analyze the frequencies contained in a sampled signal. The DFT
function implements the transformation of the feature vectors of length N by:
X(k) =
N∑
j=1
x(j)ω(j−1)(k−1)N , (5.3)
where x is a discrete audio signal and ωN = e(−2pii)/N is an Nth root of unity. DFT can
be computed efficiently in practice using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm. An
N-point FFT can produce N2 unique features because there is even symmetry around the
center point [77].
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Fig. 41. 217-point FFT Results Recorded in the House.
To investigate spectral information in different situations, we collected data in four
environments, 1) cafe, 2) cassroom, 3) house and 4) office. Two recorders (DeviceA and
DeviceB) were located within 10 inches of each other and another (DeviceC) was located
outside shown as Fig. 40. Sounds were recorded for 10 seconds at an 8 kHz sampling
rate.
Fig. 41 shows the results of 217-point FFT recorded in the house. In Fig. 41(a) and
41(b), we can see that there are similar patterns in the results of 217-point FFT between
co-located devices. However, when a device is not co-located, the patterns are different
as shown in Fig. 41(c). Specifically, the peaks occur at similar frequencies and they can
be simply used as acoustic features.
To compare these three acoustic feature extraction algorithms, we calculated STE,
ZCR, and the peak value of frequency-domain signal (performed FFT) on a 1-sec window
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Table II. Feature Match Rates in Different Environments for Co-located Devices.
Cafe Classroom House Office
Short Time Energy (STE) 0 0 0 0
Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR) 0 0.00301 0.00053 0.00736
Peak on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) 0.8666 0.8875 0.4978 0.5173
Table III. Feature Match Rates in Different Environments for Non Co-located Devices.
Cafe Classroom House Office
Short Time Energy (STE) 0 0 0 0
Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR) 0.3903 0 0 0
Peak on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) 0.0064 0.0019 0.0011 0.0084
for different cases. Then, we checked if two devices generated the same value for each
acoustic feature (STE, ZCR, and peak on FFT). Table II and III show the rate of
matching two features of co-located devices (DeviceA and DeviceB) and non co-located
devices (DeviceA and DeviceC), respectively.
The experimental results show that two co-located devices can not have the same
STE features. For ZCR, most of the cases provides very small match rates even though
the two devices are co-located. Therefore, these two features can not be used to de-
termined whether two devices are co-located or not. On the other hand, the peak of
FFT provides approximately 0.8 for cafe and class cases and 0.5 for house and office
cases. Although non co-located devices can have the same feature, the rates are very
small (less than 0.01). Therefore, we can conclude that the frequency domain features
are more appropriate for this problem.
5.3.3. Experimental Study: Frequency Domain Acoustic Feature Extraction
When the number of FFT points increases, the resolution of the spectrum obtained
also increases. At the same time, more computations and time are needed. Because of
76
the limited resources of ENS, we need to examine the trade-off between accuracy and
computational cost.
First, we compare correlation of two recorded audio signals at different lengths of
FFT in order to see the effect of the length of FFT on accuracy. For each type of
environments (cafe, classroom, office, and house), three recorders recorded sound for
10 seconds at 8 kHz. Note that DeviceA and DeviceB are located within 10 inches of
each other and DeviceC is located outside of the region. We perform the fft function on
each recorded sound with different points and then perform the corrcoef function of two
signals in Matlab. We repeated this process about 40 times.
The corrcoef function in Matlab returns cross-correlation which is a measure of the
similarity of two signals. The cross-correlation coefficients, crosscorrk can be defined as
a function of the time-lag k [78].
crosscorrk =
∑N−k
t=1 (xt − x)(yt+k − y)√∑N−1
t=1 (xt − x)2
√∑N−1
t=1 (yt − y)2
, (5.4)
where xt are yt are signals obtained at time t, and t is from 1 toN . x and y are the mean of
x and y values respectively. The corrcoef in Matlab is the zeroth lag function. crosscorrk
will lie in the range [-1, 1], with 1 indicating perfect correlation and -1 indicating perfect
anti-correlation (the inverse of one of the series). Therefore, in our work, the value of
cross-correlation coefficients is close to 1 when two devices are co-located. On the other
side, when the cross-correlation coefficients become close to 0, they are not co-related.
For this work, we do not consider the negative correlation as co-location.
We compare the cross-correlation coefficients of two cases: 1) DeviceA and DeviceB
(co-located) and 2) DeviceA and DeviceC (not co-located). To be able to distinguish
two cases, the cross-correlation coefficients should not be overlapped. Fig. 42, 43, 44 and
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Fig. 42. Correlational Coefficients of Sound Recorded at a Cafe with 28-point FFT.
45 show the correlational coefficients of 28-point FFT feature extraction with 256 Hz
sampling rate. The lines with stars and the circles indicate the correlational coefficients
between DeviceA and DeviceB (co-located) and between DeviceA and DeviceC (not co-
located), respectively. In Fig. 43 and 45, there is no overlap between two cases. However,
Fig. 42 and 44 have overlap between them. That means they are not distinguishable.
To determine whether two cases are distinguishable or not, we find the maximum
value of the correlational coeffients for devices that are not co-located. We then check
if the correlational coefficient of co-located devices is below the threshold. If so, that
means there is overlapping and the two cases are not distinguishable. After checking all
40 trials, we calculate the percentages of the trials that the correlational coeffcient of
co-located devices is below the maximum value of the correlational coefficients of non
co-located devices. Table IV shows the results with 28-point FFT, the 213-point and
217-point FFT. Obviously, the larger FFT points provide the better distinctiveness of
the two cases.
To see the effects of the length of the FFT function on computational cost, we
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Fig. 43. Correlational Coefficients of Sound Recorded at a Classroom with 28-point
FFT.
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Fig. 44. Correlational Coefficients of Sound Recorded at a House with 28-point FFT.
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Fig. 45. Correlational Coefficients of Sound Recorded at an Office with 28-point FFT.
Table IV. The Percentages of the Trials that the Correlational Coeffcient of Co-located
Devices is Below the Maximum Value of the Correlational Coefficients of Non
Co-located Devices with Different Lengths of FFT.
Length of FFT function Cafe Classroom House Office
28-point FFT 0% 2.5% 10% 0%
213-point FFT 0% 0% 5% 0%
217-point FFT 0% 0% 0% 0%
compare the execution time of 26-point, 28-point and 29-point FFT functions on Mica2
and TelosB motes. Bhatti et al. [79] provide the comparision of the execution times
of 26-point and 29-point FFT functions on a Mica2 mote. Neuman and Gaura [82]
include the measurement of energy consumption of the 27-point FFT function on a
Mica2 mote. In [80], they implemented the 28-point FFT function on a TelosB mote and
measured the execution time and energy consumption. A Mica2 mote has 4 kB of RAM
provided by the Atmel Mega 128 chip and a TelosB mote has 10 kB of RAM provided
by the TI MSP430 chip. Table V provides the details of specifications of Mica2 and
TelosB motes [26] [81] [82]. Table VI shows the summary of the measurement of the
different lengths of FFT functions. A typical 1.5V AA battery has a capacity of about
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Table V. Mica2 and TelosB Mote Designs.
Mica2 [81] TelosB [26]
Size 32 × 57 32 × 65
CPU 8 MHz Atmel Mega 128 8 MHz TI MSP430
Program Flash Memory 128 kB 48 kB
RAM 4 kB 10 kB
Table VI. Execution Time and Energy Consumption of the Different Lengths of FFT
on Mica2 and TelosB Motes.
The length of FFT Platform Execution Time Total Energy Cost
26-point FFT Mica2 56 msec [79]
27-point FFT Mica2 930 µJ [82]
28-point FFT TelosB with Radio-off 440 msec 1.32 mJ [80]
28-point FFT TelosB with Radio-on 440 msec 25.81 mJ [80]
29-point FFT Mica2 30 sec [79]
2600 mAh [80]. With two AA batteries, a TelosB mote can compute a 256-point FFT
function about 313 times with radio-on mode and about 6136 times with radio-off mode.
A 29-point FFT takes 30 sec which produces a large delay additionally. In conclusion,
FFT computation is very expensive to perform on mobile devices. Therefore, we may
need to use a small number of FFT points even though they do not support the perfect
distinctiveness.
The next question is whether frequency-domain features are random and time-
variant. This requirement is important because randomness and time-variance make
sure that the set of features is unpredictable by attackers. We perform randomness tests
using one of the popular randomness testing programs, “ENT” [83]. ENT performs a
variety of tests on the stream of bytes as an input file and produces output as follows [83]:
• Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a variable, expressed as
a number of bits per character. For a random variable X with n possible values
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x1, . . . , xn, the entropy H(X) is defined as
H(X) =
n∑
i=1
p(xi)logb
1
P (Xi)
, (5.5)
where p(xi) is the probability of xi [84]. Common values of b are 2. The measure
should be maximal if all the values of X are equally likely (all possibilities, p(xi)
are equal). In the ENT program, the entropy should be 8 bits per byte when the
inputs are random.
• Chi-square Test is one of the most commonly used tests for the randomness of
data. The ENT program interprets the percentage as the degree to which the
sequence tested is suspected of being non-random. If the percentage is greater
than 99% or less than 1%, the sequence is almost certainly “not random”. If
the percentage is between 99% and 95% or between 1% and 5%, the sequence
is “suspect”. Percentages between 90% and 95% and 5% and 10% indicate the
sequence is “almost suspect” [83].
• Arithmetic Mean is simply the result of summing all the bytes in the file and
dividing by the file length. If the data are close to random, this should be about
127.5. If the mean departs from this value, the values are consistently high or
low [83].
• Monte Carlo Value for Pi Monte Carlo methods are also generally used as a ran-
domness test. In this program, each successive sequence of six bytes is used as 24
bit X and Y co-ordinates within a square. If the (X, Y) point is inside a circle
inscribed within the square, it is considered a “hit”. With large streams, the per-
centage of hits called Pi will approach the correct value of pi if the sequence is close
to random [83] [85].
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Table VII. Results of Randomness Test using ENT Program.
Cafe Classroom House Office
Entropy 7.57 7.58 7.52 7.54
Chi-square Test (the number of success) 0 0 0 0
Arithmetic Mean 126.28 125.75 128.30 127.10
Monte Carlo Value for Pi 3.12 3.13 3.12 3.14
Serial Correlation Coefficient 0.70 0.43 0.81 1.53
• Serial Correlation Coefficient measures the correlation of successive bytes in the
file. For random sequences, this value will be close to zero [83].
We first performed 28-point FFT on each 10 second sound and generated the sequence of
the results for all sound data (approximately 40 trials). We then ran the ENT program
with this sequence and Table VII shows the results for each environment. The sequence
of frequency-domain features succeeded in Entropy, Arithmetic Mean, and Monte Carlo
Value for pi tests, but failed in Chi-square and Serial Correlation Coefficient tests.
5.3.4. Proposed Authentication Scheme
Previously, we discussed our experimental study on acoustic feature extraction in
Section 5.3.2. We found that the peaks in frequency domain occur at similar locations.
However, they may not be exactly the same. Second, FFT computation is very expensive
to be performed on mobile devices. Therefore, we may need to use a small number of
FFT points even though they do not support the perfect distinctiveness. Third, sounds
vary over time, but they may not be highly random and time-variant in the short term.
On the basis of these observations, we propose a simple acoustic feature extraction
and verification methods. Since frequency-domain feature extraction produces an overall
result detailing the frequencies contained in the entire audio signal, there is no distinction
as to where these frequencies occurred in the signal. However, environmental sound is
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a time-varying signal caused by random environmental activities. This work uses a
hybrid approach to take advantages of spectral and temporal information. The recorded
audio signal is split into several frames and frequency-domain feature extraction is then
performed on each frame.
For the secure feature exchange, a Bloom filter is used in this work. [86] used
the Bloom filter to test membership and similarly this work uses this filter to express
multiple acoustic features in one set. As discussed above, the distinctiveness may not
be perfect because of the trade-off between computational complexity and accuracy.
The multiple acoustic features are suggested in order to improve the possibility to be
matched and distinctiveness. The Bloom filter is represented as a bit array. Each
acoustic feature is hashed using hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1. They have good
properties: computationally impossible to find the original message from the hash result
and computationally impossible to find two distinct messages with the same output [86].
Due to the different lengths of the results of the hash functions, the modulo operation
is used to fit the same length of the bit array. The modulo function is applied to two
numbers: the hash result and the length of the filter. These results are used as indexes
to determine the bit to set in the filter. The bits of these indexes in the array are set as
1 and the other bits are set as zero. The filter is used as the feature set in this work.
The main advantage of using the Bloom filter in this dissertation is that the length of
the feature set can be fixed with different number of features in the set. Therefore, the
network packet size of the feature exchange step does not need to be adapted. In Fig. 46,
the number of features equals the number of the window, w.
Table VIII describes the notation used in this section. Fig. 46 presents the acoustic
feature extraction mechanism proposed in this dissertation. Suppose the requester, r
84
sends a request to the verifier, v. The overall steps of the feature extraction are as
follows:
1. v generates a random number, n, and sends it to r. The random number is used
to prevent this authentication process from reusing valid features of previous com-
munications.
2. Both v and r start recording sounds.
3. Each device performs the feature extraction process. The recorded sounds are
divided into w windows and FFT computation is applied to each window. The
peak of each window is calculated and the results are denoted as Pi when i is from
1 to w.
4. A peak value, Pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ w, is concatenated with n, Pi|n. Apply the hash
function to each result, H(Pi|n).
5. The hashed results are applied to the modulo function, H(Pi|n) mod l when l is
the length of the filter. The Bloom filter is set using these modulo results. Because
the peaks of the windows can be duplicated, a bit in the filter can be set multiple
times. Thus, the number of bits with the value of 1 is up to w.
6. r sends the filter as the feature set to v.
After receiving the feature set, v performs the verification step. To verify it, v
compares every bit of two arrays: one received from r and another computed locally. If
the percentage of the matching bits ≥ t%, r is authenticated successfully by v. Oth-
erwise, the authentication fails. Fig. 47 describes the verification step proposed in this
dissertation.
This proposed acoustic feature extraction and verification scheme can be extended
to the key exchange protocol and location-based access control using the existing tech-
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Table VIII. Notations.
Notation Description
IDi The unique ID of device i.
Pi The peak of window i.
It is the index of the maximum amplitude on the window i.
FSi The feature set calculated by device i.
a mod b The modulo operation of two operands: a and b.
The modulo operation returns the remainder when dividing a by b.
H(m) The hash of the message m
m1|m2 The concatenation of the message m1 and m2
A→ B : m A sends the message m to B
niques. In this part, we will give an example of the extended Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol [90] with the proposed scheme. The Diffie-Hellman protocol will be discussed
in Section 5.4. The protocol is as follows:
1. r → v: IDr|n1
r sends the request to v with its ID, IDr and a random number, n1. r and v
start recording sound. Then, they divide sounds into windows, perform the FFT
function on each window, and find the peak of each result, Pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ w when
w is the number of the window.
2. v → r : IDv|n2|(ga mod p)|FSv
v generates a random number a and calculates IDv|n1|(ga mod p) = n. g and p
are a prime number and a generator explained in Section 5.4. Using n, it calculates
the feature set, FSv using the steps discussed above. Then, v generates a random
number, n2 and sends the message, IDv|n2|(ga mod p)|FSv to r.
3. r → v : IDr|(gb mod p)|FSr
r calculates the feature set using Pi and n1 that has been generated at step 1, and
IDv and (ga mod p) that were received from v at step 3. Then, it performs the
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verification step with the calculated feature set and received feature set, FSr. If
they match, r proceeds to the next step. It generates a random number b and the
shared key k, gab is computed. Then, r calculates IDr|n2|(gab mod p) = n. Using
n, it calculates the feature set, FSr and sends the message, IDr|n2|(gb mod p)|FSr
to v.
4. v performs a verification process similar to the previous step (step 3). It calculates
IDr|n2|(gab mod p) = n with IDr and gb mod p extracted from the received
message. Using n and peaks calculated at step 1, it computes the feature set. If
the calculated feature set and FSr match, r gets authenticated and the shared key
k = gab will be used for communication between v and r.
To analyze the security of this protocol, we will consider the possible attacks against
man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack and guessing attack defined in Section 5.2.2.
• Replay attack : If the feature set does not vary over time, an attacker can capture
the valid features from the previous communication and simply reuse them to get
authenticated. In the proposed protocol, two devices select random numbers n1
and n2 and the peaks (acoustic features) are changed continuously. Therefore, an
attacker can not copy and reuse the valid feature set from the previous communi-
cations.
• Man-in-the-middle attack : A man-in-the-middle attacker tries to intercept and
change messages with the valid feature in order to impersonate a legitimate user.
Therefore, he or she needs a valid feature set that has at least t% (Note t is the
threshold) of bits matched. Experimental results in Section 5.3.5 will show that a
device located outside of the restricted area can not sense enough acoustic features
to generate a valid feature set.
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• Guessing attack : means guessing a valid feature set in order to impersonate a co-
located device. This depends on the length of the feature set. To represent the
128-bit output of the MD-5 hash function in a filter, the length of the bit array
can be 128-bit. With the longer bits of the feature set, it is hard to guess a valid
set.
5.3.5. Experimental Results
The acoustic feature extraction technique proposed in Section 5.3.4 was imple-
mented on a Google Android Dev 1 phone that is designed for advanced developers. It is
a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module)-unlocked and hardware-unlocked device. Therefore,
it is possible to use any SIM card in the device [87]. The specification of Android Dev
Phone 1 is in Table IX. We tested it in a room for a smart home scenario. To find
the effect of distances on the distinctiveness, two Android phones were placed in a room
within 10m, 20m, and 30m of each other. Then, one Android phone was placed inside
and another was placed outside of the room.
We used 28-point FFT function because of the reasonable delay and computational
complexity. The length of each window was 1 second. The sampling rate was 8kHz that
can be supported by android.media.AudioRecord library [88]. The 1 second window of
sound is downsampled by 32 (from 8k to 256) to reduce the sampling rate of a signal.
When the signal is downsampled, the signal may have aliasing that causes unwanted
signals in the desired frequency band [89]. To prevent aliasing, the Shannon-Nyquist
sampling theorem must be satisfied. The sampling theorem says that a digital signal
processing system with a sampling rate of fs can sample a signal with its highest fre-
quency up to half of the sampling rate, fs/2 (called folding frequency) without aliasing
89
Table IX. Android Dev Phone 1 Hardware Specifications.
Android Dev Phone 1 [87]
Touch screen
Trackball
3.2 megapixel camera with autofocus
Wi-Fi
GPS-enabled
Bluetooth v2.0 with
- Handsfree profile v1.5
- Headset profile v1
3G WCDMA (1700/2100 MHz)
Quad-band GSM (850/900/1800/1900 MHz)
256MB Flash Memory
192MB RAM
QWERTY slider keyboard
Includes 1 GB MicroSD card
noise [89]. This folding frequency will be decreased after downsampling. Therefore, if
the signal to be downsampled has frequency components larger than the new folding
frequency, aliasing effects will occur. To overcome this problem, in signal processing,
a low-pass filter is used as an anti-aliasing filter to reduce the bandwidth of the signal
before the signal is downsampled.
This work used a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter that is one of the primary
types of filters used in Digital Signal Processing [89]. The output of an FIR filter is
defined as:
y(n) =
K∑
i=0
bix(n− i) = b0x(n) + b1x(n− 1) + · · ·+ bkx(n− k), (5.6)
where x(n) is the input signal and y(n) is the output signal. bi are the filter coefficients
and K + 1 denotes the FIR filter length. We call it the K-th order filter (also called
K-th tap filter). This length, K, is related to the amount of memory needed, the number
of calculations required, and the amount of filtering that it can do. Reducing K used
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in the filter will reduce the number of calculations to process, but the quality of the
filtering will be degraded. To calculate bi for FIR low pass-filter in our case, we used the
MATLAB function fir1(K,Wn) that returns the vector of b the FIR lowpass filter of
order K and the normalized cutoff frequency Wn. Wn is a number between 0 and 1, where
1 corresponds to the sampling frequency in the Shannon-Nyquist sampling theorem. In
this work, we used k = 32 and Wn = 0.0625.
After passing the low-pass FIR filter, we implement the downsampling part. To
implement it with a downsampling factor = M, we can simply keep every Mth sample.
In our case, to downsample the signal by 32, we keep every 32nd sample, and throw 31
samples out of every 32 samples away.
After the downsampling step, the acoustic feature extraction and verification pro-
cesses discussed in Section 5.3.4 are performed on each phone.
To evaluate the satisfaction of distinctiveness requirement, we use false positive and
false negative rates.
• False negative: the error of failing to reject authentication when it is, in fact, false.
• False positive: the error of rejecting authentication when it is actually true.
In a perfect authentication system, the false positive rate and negative rate should be
zero. Non-zero false negative rates mean that the system is vulnerable, so the false
negative is more critical.
Fig. 48 and Fig. 48 show the experimental results of co-located devices at different
distances and non co-located devices with 10 acoustic features (the number of windows,
w = 10), respectively. As shown in Fig. 48, we found that the number of features matched
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decreased as the distance increased. As the results in Fig. 49, we set the threshold rate,
t = 40% to prevent non-zero false negative rate.
Fig. 50 and 51 present the FNR and FPR with different test cases: co-located
devices with distances = 10m, 20m, and 30m and non co-located devices when w = 10
and w = 6, respectively. For both cases, the threshold, t = 40% can be used for FNR = 0.
However, the threshold value may be different in different environments (e.g. classroom
or conference room). With the larger threshold, t, obviously, the possibility of FNR
decreases, but FPR increases. This means that the system prevents attackers getting
authenticated, but a device may need to retry several times even though it is co-located
with another and supposed to be successfully authenticated.
Another issue is that this scheme provides reasonable results when two devices are
within proximity and therefore it may not cover an entire room area. This is mostly
because we use a small number of the FFT function and the microphone of the Android
phone has a noise like a hissing sound. We expect many mobile devices like smart phones
and tablet PCs have better hardware resources. In addition, we can improve this scheme
by using multiple contextual informations as well as the trust propagation technique
discussed in Section 6.1.
5.4. Related Work
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [90] is a well-known key agreement pro-
tocol. It allows two entities to agree on a secret key over an insecure medium. Fig. 52
describes the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol. Suppose Alice and Bob want to set up a
shared key. The protocol uses two parameters p and g. They are both public. p is
a prime number and g (usually called a generator) is a primitive root less than p. A
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primitive root is any number with the following property: for every number n between
1 and p-1 inclusive, there is a power k of g such that n = mod (gk, p).
The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice generates a random number a and Bob generates a random number b.
2. They derive their public values using p and g and their private values. Alice’s
public value is ga mod p. Bob’s public value is gb mod p.
3. Alice and Bob exchange their public values.
4. Alice computes gba = (gb)a mod p, and Bob computes gab = (ga)b mod p. Since
gba = gab = k, Alice and Bob now have a shared secret key k.
In this protocol, it is computationally infeasible to calculate the shared secret key k = gab
mod p given the two public values ga mod p and gb mod p when the prime p is sufficiently
large [90]. In other words, even though ga mod p and gb mod p are known to everyone,
they can not compute gab mod p without a or b.
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Fig. 52. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol.
However, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol does not have an authentication
process. Thus, it is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack which monitors a com-
munication between two parties and falsifies the exchanges to impersonate one of the
parties. A number of enhancements [91], [92], [93] have been developed, but they use a
public-key certificate or pre-shared password for authentication.
Recently several researchers have developed systems to authenticate and establish
a key without a pre-existing trust relationship such as a public-key certificate and pass-
word. Stajano et al. have introduced the Resurrecting Duckling technique in [94]. When
a new device wakes up, it is imprinted by the active master (like a duckling recognizes
the mother). This imprinting must be done by the physical contact. However, the re-
quirement of physical contact among all communicating devices will be too restrictive
for our targeted applications.
McCune et al. [95] have developed an authentication mechanism using a visual
channel called Seeing-is-Believing (SiB). SiB assumes a human user is capable of visually
identifying the target device. In this approach, the sender first sends its key to the other
via wireless channel. At the same time, it displays the hash of its key in the form of a
barcode. On the receiver side, the device should have a photo camera. Using this photo
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camera, a user scans the bar code on the sender’s display. Then, the receiver translates
the scanned barcode into a binary key, and compares it with the key received over the
wireless channel. One problem in SiB is that devices must have additional hardware (a
display or a photo camera). Also, this lays burden upon a human user.
Some papers [96] [97] have proposed using an audio channel for authentication.
In Loud-and-Clear [96], two devices exchange their keys over the wireless channel. The
hash of the key is translated in syntactically correct (but usually nonsensical) English-like
sentence. One device plays it and the other displays it. The human user compares them
and verifies their keys. HAPADEP in [97] is similar to Loud-and-Clear, but it does not
need a display. After key exchange, both devices play the key as sound. A user verifies
the key by listening to a sound recording. Clearly, these schemes are not suitable to our
targeted applications because of the reliance on human assistant. Another drawback is
that translating and encoding (to sound) is too expensive for the resource-limited mobile
devices.
The Amigo system by Varshavsky in [98] has used dynamic characteristics of the
radio environment. Two devices first listen to their radio environment and derive a shared
secret from it. If these devices are in close proximity, they will share the same secret.
The advantage of this technique is that human involvement and additional hardware are
not required. However, the performance of this technique highly depends on the types of
WiFi cards and network conditions, such as WiFi usage. Some environments may have
no radio signals or not vary over time, and so attackers can easily learn about the radio
environments.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Collaboration is one of the important features of ENS because sharing available
resources and information can enhance the system performance as well as context aware-
ness. However, it could produce additional communication and data processing to the
system, especially gateways. To address this problem, this dissertation proposed a hi-
erarchical architecture with mobile gateways called Mobile Edge Computing Devices
(MECD). An MECD is designed to manage the local network of end nodes that are
associated with a moving object and process data generated by them locally. Local data
processing can reduce the amount of data to be sent to the server. In addition, it al-
lows local (neighboring) devices to share information directly without participation of
servers. Therefore, the hierarchical system architecture with MECDs improved scalabil-
ity by managing networks in a distributed manner. The case study in Chapter 3 proved
the feasibility of the proposed architecture and provided valuable lessons learned for the
further research.
This dissertation also addressed a reachability problem between MECDs and the
remote server because of the physical environmental constraints in Chapter 4. The
MECD is an interface between the end nodes and servers and thus the unreachability of
the MECD is a critical problem in ENS. In the proposed hierarchical system architecture,
the MECD-level network is designed for collaboration among MECDs. This helps in
not only sharing information, but also sending data to the remote server for devices
which have no direct connection to the server. This dissertation proposed using mesh
networking for the MECD-level network because a mesh network can deliver reliability by
redundant paths. The simulation results showed that any MECD can communicate with
the remote server through the mesh network of neighboring MECDs for an intelligent
container scenario.
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Finally, Chapter 5 provided a new solution to authenticate strangers in ENS. The
self-organizing region-based authentication problem was defined and the acoustic feature-
based technique was proposed to solve this problem. Experimental studies on acoustic
feature extraction were conducted to compare the proposed technique and other time-
domain feature extracion techniques. Then, the proposed technique was tested for a
smart home scenario and the results showed that this scheme worked in a small region.
6.1. Future Work
In this section, we discuss the future work and research directions.
6.1.1. Energy Efficiency Problem of MECDs
MECDs are mobile gateways that are designed to be carried by a moving object such
as a person, vehicle, or animal. To be portable, the MECD needs to be powered by a small
battery. Therefore, the power management module of the MECD described in Section 3.2
will be a key component for the future research. For example, by the documents of the
Department of Homeland Security, cargo containers make several roundtrips per year
and the intelligent container systems are required to support at least one year lifetime
with 3,000 hours operations as discussed in Section A.1. During our experimental tests
in Section A.2, we confirmed that energy-efficiency will be a key gating factor to develop
these battery-powered mobile gateways.
Generally, a power saving mode (also called a sleeping mode) can be used to save en-
ergy consumption. However, MECDs are responsible to support communication between
end nodes and the remote server and also communication with other MECDs. There-
fore, supporting a sleeping mode for MECDs is challenging because the MECD needs
to be synchronized with its local end nodes as well as neighboring MECDs. Moreover,
the reachability of the MECD-level network may be degraded when some of MECDs are
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sleeping and can not participate forwarding the packets to the remote server. Therefore,
the future work is needed to minimize the energy consumption without degrading the
system performance.
6.1.2. Network Analysis and Management for Mesh-networked MECDs
The MECD-level network was evaluated for the intelligent container application in
Section 4.2. The simulation in this work assumed that all cargo containers in the network
were the same size. In the real world, however, a cargo container can be any size of ISO
(International Organization for Standardization) containers. The additional simulation
with heterogeneous cargo containers is left for the future work in order to obtain a better
validation of the MECD-level networks.
To simplify the evaluation for the intelligent container scenario, it was assumed that
the forwarder was the MECD at one of top corners. Another research question for the
future work is how to select a proper forwarder that can provide the perfect server reach-
ability for all other neighboring MECDs for a general ESN. The forwarder will consume
additional energy to communicate with the remote server and thus forwarder selection
needs to be dynamic based on the current energy conditions of the group members in the
mesh-networked MECDs. Furthermore, each MECD has different workload because the
number of end nodes in its local network and the amount of data generated by these end
nodes are different. Therefore, the condition of other types of resources such as available
computational capacity and bandwidth can be considered as well.
As discussed in Section 4.2.5, the optimal transmission power of the MECD to
minimize the total energy consumption of the MECD-level network depends on the
temperature, network size and network density. A dynamic scheduling of the MECD’s
transmission power is left for the future work.
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6.1.3. Self-organizing Region-based Authentication
As we discussed in Section 5.3.5, one of challenging problems in the acoustic feature-
based scheme is that sound is sensitive to a distance between devices. The audio-based
self-organizing authentication technique could successfully distinguish co-located devices
from non co-located devices with a small region. However, in some cases, our authentica-
tion technique fails to authenticate devices even if they are in the same region. Therfore,
we need a way to extend the coverage for general ENS applications.
A future work could be using multiple types of contextual information to supple-
ment this weakness of the acoustic features. For example, a room can share similar
physical conditions such as temperature, light, motion, and wifi signal strength. [99]
uses various ambient information including sound, light, color, motion, and wifi to gen-
erate a fingerprint. This finger print is used to find logical location information such
as ”Starbucks”, ”Walmart”, and ”Pub”. This is similar to our goal except we need to
take account of temporal changes. In other words, fingerprinting is to classify contextual
information considering spatial relation while the region-based authentication requires
classification of contextual information considering both temporal and spatial relation.
Finally, the future work can focus on the heterogeneity problem in ENS. Consider
a smart home application (called home automation) that consists of a wide range of
home devices from sensors to PCs. Home devices have different capability, for example,
PCs have more resources and computational power than sensors. In our acoustic feature-
based scheme, there is the trade-off between accuracy and computational complexity. For
example, a large size of FFT provides better distinctiveness, but it needs more complex
computation and resources. A PC may be able to compute a large size of FFT, but
a sensor may not be able to perform it. In addition, using different microphones may
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affect the results. Therefore, an acoustic feature-based scheme with the heterogeneous
devices can be a research problem for the future work.
Heterogeneity is not only related to hardware, but also software. With respect to
security, home devices have different security requirements. Fire alarm systems have high
security requirement, but toast ovens may need no security support. In [100], Krisna-
murthy et al. suggested a classification of security services for a wireless home network as
follows: 1) No security (e.g, toaster ovens and refrigerators), 2) Moderate security (e.g.,
switches on air-conditioning), 3) Wireline equivalent security (e.g., routine telephones),
4) High security (e.g., desktop, laptop computers, and cellular phones), 5) Ultra-high
security (e.g., long distance call and video on demand), and 6) Critically high security
(e.g., surveillance cameras and security alarm system). Considering this heterogeneity
of security requirements, the different security mechanisms need for different devices. A
future work can be designing a new system to apply different security levels based on
the requirements and capabilities of devices.
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APPENDIX A
STUDIES FOR INTELLIGENT CONTAINER SYSTEMS
This chapter includes our survey and experimental studies for intelligent container
systems for homeland security as well as global supply chain management.
A.1. Requirements for Intelligent Container Systems
Intelligent container systems should be able to support security requirements driven
by government regulation. Therefore, we first explored the intersection of the require-
ments of the related Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs used to inform
our system design.
An Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD) and a Marine Asset Tag Tracking
System (MATTS), two major programs initiated by DHS Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), have different objectives and requirements with
some key overlaps and synergies.
The objective of the ACSD program is to provide the next generation of maritime
shipping container security devices with multiple sensing modalities, smart condition
monitoring, automated alerting, and advanced communications [101]. The proposed de-
vices must provide a quantum increase in the level of protection and assurance. Primary
emphasis is on assuring the physical security of the container including container breach
and status of any seals or locks. Secondary emphasis is on detection of certain prohibited
cargoes, internal ambient conditions, manipulation or change of state of the contents, and
recording container interaction history. The Container Security Device request (CSD) is
for the identification of currently available inter-modal shipping container devices [102].
CSD has very similar goals with ACSD program, but requires less functionality.
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MATTS [103] focuses on developing and prototyping Tag System using RF (Radio
frequency), IR (Infrared) or other modality for shipping containers in the marine envi-
ronment in order to facilitate universal tracking. The MATTS device is a multi-modal
communication gateway for ACSD to provide global remote communications and track-
ing information for a container. A recently published RFI (Request for Information),
Single Pricing Structure for Global Connectivity to Cellular Data Services To Support
Marine Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS) Communication, is intended to address
the communication requirements of these devices [104]. In order to send alarm and sta-
tus information, HSARPA proposed to use the existing cellular data services with highly
reliable global connectivity for the MATTS devices.
Table X summarizes the functional requirements of CSD, ACSD and MATTS de-
vices. We applied the superset of these functional requirements of CSD, ACSD, and
MATTS for our system design.
A.2. Experimental Results and Discussions
A.2.1. RFID Read Ranges
For our test from Singapore to Kaohsiung, Taiwan, extensive analysis was required
to determine the correct combination of RFID reader, antenna and RFID tag to support
the read ranges required for container door coverage and compliant with the 0.5 Watts
ERP requirement. First, we measured the average read ranges of a SkyeTek M9 UHF
RFID reader [29] with the maximum output power (27 dBm). According to the datasheet
from SkyeTek [29], the M9 reader can reach approximately 3.5m (about 138 inches) with
27 dBm output power and 6 dBi antenna. However, we observed the actual read range
from our experiment shown in Table XI was much smaller than the values from SkyeTek.
We used three different types of UHF RFID tags (Alien EPC Class 1 Gen 2 [105], Avery
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Table X. The Functional Requirements of CSD, ACSD, and MATTS.
Function CSD ACSD MATTS
Sensing Detection of door opening/closing/removal Yes Yes Yes
Detection of breaching of the container No Yes No
walls, floor, or ceiling (6 side)
Monitoring container seal or lock status Option Yes Yes
Sensing loading/unloading of RFID tags No Yes No
Sensing environmental conditions Yes Yes Yes
(temperature, humidity, shock, etc)
Detection of a person or animal No Yes No
Tracking and monitoring the location Option No Yes
of the container
Alerting Monitoring the sensors for reportable events Yes Yes Yes
Notification Yes Yes Yes
Data Recording and maintaining alert events Yes Yes Yes
Input and retrieval of data Option No Yes
Commu- Local and remote communications Yes Yes Yes
uication
Life 4.5 trips per year (21 days duration No 30,000 1 year
time & 7 days loading/unloading) hours
Cost per transit $50.00
EPC Class 1 Gen 2 [106], and AWiD ISO 180006B [107]) and three different types
of external antennas (Cushcraft S9028PC 8 dBiC [108], Symbol Z1747 6.4 dBdc [109],
and Sensormatic 6.75 dBd [110]). Second, we adjusted the output power of these three
antennas to 0.5 Watts ERP required for the test from Singapore to Taiwan. Using 0.5
Watts ERP, the average read ranges of all combination of antennas and tags are 10 - 18
inches.
From our experiments, we found that additional investigation and experimentation
is required here to ensure the viability of on-board container RFID readers.
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Table XI. RFID Read Ranges.
UHF RFID Tags
Antennas EPC Class 1 Gen 2 ISO 180006B
Alien Avery AwiD
Cushcraft S9028PC 20 inches 37 inches 70 inches
(8 dBiC)
Symbol Z1747 16 inches 37 inches 75 inches
(6.4 dBdc)
Sensormatic 43 inches 88 inches 86 inches
(6.75 dBd)
A.2.2. Energy Consumption
During our test, we confirmed that energy-efficiency will be a key gating factor
to scale implementation of these battery-powered devices. Containers make several
roundtrips per year, have an extended multi-year lifespan, and do not have an entity
with umbrella ownership for maintenance and support. Therefore, these solutions must
be standalone and relatively maintenance-free, preferably taking advantage of ambient
vibration to harvest power.
Since the MATTS requirements recommend at least one year lifetime with 1 year
(3,000 hours) operations and ACSD requires 30,000 hours of annual operation, the com-
ponents of a wireless sensor network solution, such as the gateway and motes need to be
highly energy efficient. Unlike the gateway and motes, the RFID reader needs to support
only the 760 hours needed for loading/unloading operations. As we discussed above, we
can reduce energy consumption of the RFID reader using sleep mode.
To determine the actual lifetime of our system, we first measured the energy con-
sumption of the MicaZ [25] and TelosB [26] motes used in our prototype implementation.
The MicaZ mote with a MTS310 sensor board [28] attached drew 11.25 mA of current
consuming a power of 33.75 mW, while the TelosB mote just drew 0.09 mA of current
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consuming 0.42 mW of power. As expected, this clearly shows that MicaZ is the more
energy inefficient of the two. We decided to measure the actual lifetime of the MicaZ
mote because the MicaZ motes were used for Reader-mote modules and also deployed
inside the container. We programmed a MicaZ mote with a MTS310 sensor board to
broadcast a packet once every 10 seconds with sensor readings. After the readings have
been broadcast the mote shifts to power saving mode (switching off radio and the sen-
sor board). Each time the mote broadcasts sensor data (in a packet), it also forwards
the current voltage level of the battery. At the start of the experiment, the mote had
2 new AA batteries which measured 3.0V. We conducted the experiment till the mote
started indicating a low battery around 2.0V mark. Below this mark (2.0V) we were
not able to receive the transmitted signals at the distance of 4 meters. We experienced
negligible packet loss at the base station which was placed about 4 meters away. Fig. 53
presents the variation in the battery voltage with time. Even though the voltage value
was being collected once every 10 seconds, we just show two values per day (one taking
in the morning and another in the evening) to illustrate the trend. We can see that the
mote lasts about 46 days before the battery on the mote has to be replaced. Obviously,
reducing frequency of sensing and broadcasting data can increase the lifetime of MicaZ
motes.
At the next step of our experiment, we examined the high energy consumption
of the Stargate and RFID reader. The Stargate with MicaZ and AmbiCom CF WiFi
card attached drew 406 mA of current consuming a power of 1827 mW. The M9 RFID
reader on single reading drew 270 mA of current consuming a power of 1215 mW while
a continuous reading mode drew 615 mA of current consuming a power of 2767.50 mW.
During a multi-day shipment from Singapore to Taiwan, we used a large (car size) bat-
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Fig. 53. Battery Drain on Functioning MicaZ Mote over Time.
tery. However, ACSD restricts the size of a container security device so as to not reduce
the volume of a container or impact handling. To meet 1 year operations requirements,
the energy efficiency should be improved.
A.2.3. Lessons Learned
From our experimental results, we have learned many of the technology constraints
as well as broader issues that must be resolved in order to support all the DHS container
security requirements.
Current cost requirements of $50.00 US per transit is difficult to achieve with today’s
technology offerings. However, these RF technologies have been rapidly decreasing in
cost while increasing in performance and reliability due to numerous breakthroughs in
silicon, component, and solutions design.
From the experimental results, we found the RFID reading ranges were not large
enough to cover a container. To address this problem, multiple readers as well as targeted
antenna and tag design can be used. In addition, the highly energy efficient devices as
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well as management (sleep mode, adjusted frequency of reading/sensing/broadcasting)
are required.
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